In 2006, North Carolina became the first state to establish an innocence commission—a state institution with the power to review and investigate individual post-conviction claims of actual innocence. And on February 17, 2010, after spending seventeen years in prison for a murder he did not commit, Greg Taylor became the first person exonerated through the innocence commission process. This Article argues that the innocence commission model pioneered by North Carolina has proven itself to be a major institutional improvement over conventional post-conviction review. Existing court-based procedures are inadequate to address collateral claims of actual innocence, and innocence commissions, with their independent investigatory powers, are better suited to review such claims. While critics on the Right claim that additional review mechanisms are unnecessary or too costly, and critics on the Left continue to push for a court-based right to innocence review, the commission model offers a compromise that fairly balances the values of both finality and accuracy in the criminal justice system. At the same time, the North Carolina commission suffers from the tension—inherent in all expert agencies—between efficiency and discretion, on the one hand, and procedural fairness and accountability, on the other. I offer several suggestions for procedural reform to help achieve a balance between these competing values. Overall, the record of the North Carolina commission demonstrates that the commission approach can provide justice where the traditional court system has failed, and, with the reforms I suggest here, can be a model for states across the country.

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INTRODUCTION

You want to hear that word—innocent—because that’s what you are.

— Greg Taylor, the first person to be exonerated through the procedures of the North Carolina Innocence Inquiry Commission.

The problem of innocence will not go away. Since 1989, more than 250 Americans have been exonerated of serious crimes because subsequent evidence demonstrated their actual innocence. These exonerations, made possible largely because of new DNA technology, constitute the most dramatic story in American law.


criminal law over the past two decades. The problem of innocent people languishing in prison for crimes they did not commit is not a new one. But the exonerations of the past twenty years have dramatically changed our perception of the scope of the problem. At one time we may have been able to comfort ourselves with the thought that our elaborate criminal procedures made punishment of the innocent virtually impossible, but we can no longer be so complacent. Today, we know that hundreds, if not thousands, of innocent people have been convicted and imprisoned for crimes they did not commit. The sheer number of innocent people convicted is the major empirical aspect of this dilemma. The lack of any clear procedure for entertaining post-conviction claims of actual innocence, coupled with the undeniable existence of wrongful convictions, is the Innocence Problem that will be the focus of this Article.

The legal aspect of our Innocence Problem is the enduring resistance of our judicial system to recognizing post-conviction claims based on factual innocence. While there is a common perception that criminal convictions may be endlessly appealed and challenged collaterally, the reality is that after a valid conviction, there are very few ways for criminals to make fact-based challenges to the verdict. The celebrated writ of habeas corpus—the most well-known avenue of post-conviction procedure—is simply not a vehicle for such fact-based challenges.

2. The total rate of factually false convictions is a matter of considerable debate. Compare D. Michael Risinger, Innocents Convicted: An Empirically Justified Factual Wrongful Conviction Rate, 97 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 761, 778–80 (2007) (finding that, in 3.3% to 5.0% of convictions in capital rape-murder trials in the United States between 1982 and 1989, the defendants were innocent), with Ronald J. Allen & Larry Laudan, Deadly Dilemmas, 41 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 65, 80 n.81 (2008) (arguing that the rate of false convictions in Risinger’s study would be closer to 0.045% if plea bargains were included). Even a 2% error rate in the conviction of those currently incarcerated in U.S. prisons would mean that roughly 46,000 people are incarcerated in the United States for crimes they did not commit. See N.C. Aizenman, New High in U.S. Prison Numbers: Growth Attributed to More Stringent Sentencing Laws, WASH. POST, Feb. 29, 2008, at A1 (estimating the total prison population of the United States at 2.3 million). The best estimates suggest that thousands of innocent people are convicted annually. Richard A. Wise et al., How to Analyze the Accuracy of Eyewitness Testimony in a Criminal Case, 42 CONN. L. REV. 435, 440 (2009) (“Each year, thousands of men and women in the United States are wrongfully convicted of felonies that they did not commit.”).

3. See infra Part I. A word on terminology: I use the terms “actually innocent” and “factually innocent” interchangeably to refer to defendants who did not commit the crime for which they were convicted. See, e.g., Daniel Givelber, Meaningless Acquittals, Meaningful Convictions: Do We Reliably Acquit the Innocent?, 49 RUTGERS L. REV. 1317, 1346 n.92 (1997) (“Actual innocence means what it says—the defendant did not commit the crime of which he has been convicted.”). I call convictions of the factually innocent “false convictions” and consider them a subset of the larger class of “wrongful convictions.” Wrongful convictions include all convictions based on legal error. See Andrew M. Siegel, Moving Down the Wedge of Injustice: A Proposal for a Third Generation of Wrongful Convictions Scholarship and Advocacy, 42 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1219, 1219 n.1 (2005) (“I count myself among those who use the term ‘wrongful conviction’ to refer not only to the conviction of the innocent but also to any conviction achieved in part through the violation of constitutional rights or through the use of systems and procedures that render the proceedings fundamentally unfair.”). For the purposes of this Article, I refer to any false conviction or wrongful conviction as a “miscarriage of justice.”
The U.S. Supreme Court has consistently refused to recognize “actual innocence” as a ground for habeas relief despite the pleas of numerous plaintiffs, activists, and academics.\(^4\) And while most state criminal procedure codes provide for motions for retrial, the statutes of limitations for such motions are usually very short and strictly enforced.\(^5\) Many courts, most famously the Supreme Court in *Herrera v. Collins*, suggest that prisoners bringing claims of actual innocence should address their pleas to their state governors (or the President), who have the power to pardon.\(^6\) But, of course, executive clemency is a matter of pure discretion, it is politically risky, and many state pardon boards are ill-equipped to scrutinize such pleas, even if they are open to them.\(^7\) For a while, the most promising avenue for relief appeared to be the statutes passed in almost every state over the past fifteen years allowing for claims of innocence based on DNA technology.\(^8\) Unfortunately, these statutes place so many procedural limitations on the types of plaintiffs who can use them, the time within which such motions may be brought, and the scope of conviction covered that they have proven to be wholly inadequate in providing a real mechanism for exonerating the innocent.\(^9\)

\(^4\) Dist. Attorney’s Office for Third Judicial Dist. v. Osborne, 129 S. Ct. 2308, 2321 (2009) ("Whether such a federal right exists is an open question. We have struggled with it over the years, in some cases assuming, arguendo, that it exists while also noting the difficult questions such a right would pose and the high standard any claimant would have to meet."); House v. Bell, 547 U.S. 518, 554–55 (2006) ("House urges the Court to answer the question left open in *Herrera* and hold not only that freestanding innocence claims are possible but also that he has established one. We decline to resolve this issue."); *Herrera v. Collins*, 506 U.S. 390, 401 (1993) ("Few rulings would be more disruptive of our federal system than to provide for federal habeas review of freestanding claims of actual innocence.").

\(^5\) *See infra* Part I.

\(^6\) 506 U.S. at 415 ("Executive clemency has provided the ‘fail safe’ in our criminal justice system.").

\(^7\) Nicholas Berg, *Turning a Blind Eye to Innocence: The Legacy of Herrera v. Collins*, 42 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 121, 145–46 (2005) ("For a number of reasons, clemency is simply institutionally incapable of providing meaningful and comprehensive review of bare-innocence claims. Throughout the country, the clemency process poses three major problems: (1) it is subject to the whims of the political process, (2) it lacks guaranteed procedural safeguards, and (3) its use is approaching the vanishing point."); Margaret Colgate Love, *Sentence Reduction Mechanisms in a Determinate Sentencing System: Report of the Second Look Roundtable*, 21 FED. SENT’G. REP. 211, 213 (2009) ("[P]roposals to ‘ramp up’ clemency in the federal system may be stymied by the resources this would require from prosecutors and courts.").

\(^8\) *See Kathy Swedlow, Don’t Believe Everything You Read: A Review of Modern ‘Post-Conviction’ DNA Testing Statutes*, 38 CAt. W. L. REV. 355, 355–56 (2002) ("There is no doubt that these statutes are revolutionary: they create a realistic hope for some of the ‘wrongfully convicted,’ erect brand new legal avenues for relief, and demand a new level of accuracy from the criminal justice system.").

\(^9\) *See id.* at 356–66 (detailing the many procedural barriers to relief under the new DNA-specific statutes). *See generally* Daniel S. Medwed, *Up the River Without a Procedure: Innocent Prisoners and Newly Discovered Non-DNA Evidence in State Courts*, 47 ARIZ. L. REV. 655 (2005) (detailing the many procedural barriers to post-conviction relief for petitioners who do not have DNA evidence).
For a variety of reasons, North Carolina was an early leader in the movement of states to respond to the dramatic rise in exonerations due to DNA technology. A series of high-profile exonerations—including those of Ronald Cotton, Terrence Garner, and Darryl Hunt—galvanized the legal community, and the Chief Justice of the State called a conference in October 2002 that led to the creation of a body called the North Carolina Actual Innocence Commission (the NCAIC). The NCAIC’s original mission was to study the issue of wrongful convictions and to make recommendations to “reduce or eliminate the possibility of the wrongful conviction of an innocent person.” The NCAIC’s first report summarized its research into the problem of erroneous eyewitness testimony and recommended a number of specific reforms to eyewitness identification procedures. Other states also convened similar commissions to study systemic problems leading to wrongful convictions. A number of those commissions produced significant reports detailing the most salient causes of wrongful conviction, as well as suggestions for improvements to law enforcement and trial procedures. Only the NCAIC, however, recommended the creation of a standing state innocence commission—a dedicated entity with the power to factually review individual convictions and to refer worthy cases for further judicial review. Despite considerable political obstacles, the state of North Carolina implemented the recommendations put forward by the NCAIC.

10. See Wise et al., supra note 2, at 437–40 (discussing Ronald Cotton’s conviction and subsequent exoneration).
15. Id. at 653.
17. See id.
In 2006, the North Carolina legislature passed, and the governor signed into law, a bill establishing the North Carolina Innocence Inquiry Commission (the NCIIC). Modeled after a British body called the Criminal Cases Review Commission, the NCIIC is an independent state agency with a statutory mandate “to investigate and determine credible claims of factual innocence.” By design, it has the necessary investigatory and subpoena power to conduct factual investigations, and when the Commission finds that a petitioner’s claim of actual innocence is more probable than not, it forwards the case to a dedicated three-judge panel chosen by the Chief Justice of the State. Only the three-judge panel has the authority to vacate the underlying conviction, and it does so only if it finds that the petitioner has proven his claim of innocence “by clear and convincing evidence.” On February 17, 2010, Greg Taylor, a North Carolina man serving a life sentence for the 1991 murder of a 26-year-old woman, became the first person ever exonerated through the procedures of the NCIIC.

The goal of this Article is to explain the commission approach to the Innocence Problem and to test it against criticisms both large and small. I begin by explaining the origins of the Innocence Problem in Part I and the history of the commission approach in Part II. In Part III, I canvas the major holistic criticisms of the commission approach from both the Right and the Left. I argue that innocence commissions represent a sensible and pragmatic step forward in the classic debate between those who advocate for ever more generous collateral review and those who doubt the need for any further post-conviction procedures whatsoever. The commission approach cuts through the procedural morass that makes substantive factual review in court virtually impossible for all but a lucky few. It focuses attention where it should be—the merits of petitioners’ claims of actual innocence—rather than on peripheral procedural issues. On the other hand, the commission approach does not create any new constitutional rights for petitioners, nor does it place any significant new burdens on the state judiciary. It

wake_county/story/330257.html (noting that many prosecutors and victims’ advocates vigorously opposed the creation of the North Carolina Innocence Inquiry Commission).


21. See id. § 15A-1467 to -1468.

22. See id. § 15A-1469(a).

23. § 15A-1469(h).


25. I use the terms Right and Left in the colloquial way they are often invoked in discussions of criminal justice. The “Right” represents a more conservative, law-and-order, pro-prosecution perspective, sometimes called the Crime Control model. The “Left” stands for a more reform-minded, proceduralist, pro-defense perspective, sometimes called the Due Process model. See HERBERT L. PACKER, THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION 163–65 (1968) (describing the Due Process and Crime Control models of criminal procedure).

26. The commission approach burdens the judiciary only in those rare cases where the Commission refers a case to a three-judge panel for the ultimate decision on
thus strikes the proper balance between the values of finality and the values of additional review and accuracy.

In Part IV, I lay out the case for the specific advantages of the commission approach over court-based procedures. I argue that innocence commissions share the merits of other single-focus agencies: namely, the development of subject-matter expertise, the power to conduct extensive fact-finding, and the mandate to identify, and recommend fixes for, systemic failures. In Part V, I discuss some of the disadvantages of the commission approach—in particular, the great discretion afforded bureaucrats with very little accountability—and suggest several reforms to increase the procedural fairness and accountability of innocence commissions.

By itself, the commission approach cannot solve the Innocence Problem because the sources of wrongful conviction are too diverse, and not all errors can be caught after trial. But North Carolina’s approach has the potential to recast the debate about the Innocence Problem from one about constitutional rights, the limits of habeas corpus, and judicial resources, to a pragmatic discussion of how an expert agency can best deliver accurate, efficient, and accountable results. The North Carolina commission, along with the process that brought it into existence, ought to serve as a model for other states as they wrestle with the Innocence Problem.

I. TRADITIONAL NOTIONS OF FINALITY AND THE CREATION OF THE INNOCENCE PROBLEM

This Part will explain (a) why fact-based post-conviction review is anomalous within the Anglo-American criminal justice system and (b) why post-conviction review procedures currently available—motions for retrial, habeas corpus, and the new wave of DNA-inspired innocence statutes—do not provide sufficient solutions to the Innocence Problem. American criminal law has traditionally refused to recognize the legitimacy of post-conviction claims of innocence. The reasons for this traditional aversion are deeply rooted in the Anglo-American criminal justice system and its adversarial structure.

First, in the division of labor between the judge and the jury in our system, fact-finding has traditionally been the province of the jury.27 The role of the jury is so sacrosanct that the Founders wrote it directly into the Constitution, exoneration. So far, in just over three years of operation, the Commission has referred only two cases to a judicial panel. See David Zucchino, North Carolina Man Exonerated After 17 Years, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 18, 2010, http://articles.latimes.com/2010/feb/17/nation/la-na-innocence18-2010feb18 (“Taylor’s case was only the second to reach the three-judge panel, which is appointed by the chief justice of the state Supreme Court.”).

27. See, e.g., 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *379–80 (“[T]he principles and axioms of law... should be deposited in the breasts of the judges... But in settling and adjusting a question of fact... a competent number of sensible and upright jurymen... will be found the best investigators of truth, and the surest guardians of public justice.”).
giving criminal defendants the right to a jury trial. Judges—both at the trial level and on appeal—are thus understandably reluctant to usurp the jury’s role by second-guessing a factual finding. The judge–jury division of labor is built into the trial process from the beginning—judges often explicitly tell criminal juries that they are the fact-finders—and there is a correspondingly high standard of review necessary for a trial judge or appellate panel to reverse a jury’s fact-finding in a criminal case. Because of the jury’s role as the sole fact-finder, fact-based appeals seem redundant in the traditional model of the Anglo-American trial. Indeed, the comparativist Mirjan Damaska finds the key distinction between common law and civil law criminal systems in the contrast between the common-law ideal of a flat, nonprofessional body of decision-makers and the Continental ideal of a hierarchy of expert judicial decision-makers. The Anglo-American system thus valorizes juries and devalues appeals, while the Continental system prizes professional expertise and enforces professionalism through frequent appeals to higher authority.

28. In fact, the right to a jury trial in criminal cases is set out in at least two places in the Constitution. U.S. Const. art. III, § 2, cl. 3 (“The Trial of all Crimes, except in Cases of Impeachment, shall be by Jury . . .”); U.S. Const. amend. VI (“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed . . .”).

29. See, e.g., Lee v. Moore, 213 So. 2d 197, 198 (Ala. 1968) (arguing that a trial court’s power to grant motions for new trial “should be hesitant[ly] exercised, because the verdict of a jury results from one of the most precious rights in our system of government, that is, the right of trial by jury.”); Wayne R. LaFave et al., Criminal Procedure 1160 (3d ed. 2000) (“Courts are naturally skeptical of claims that a defendant, fairly convicted, with proper representation by counsel, should now be given a second opportunity because of new information that has suddenly been acquired.”).

30. Judicial Council of California Criminal Jury Instruction 200 (2009) (“You must decide what the facts are. It is up to all of you, and you alone to decide what happened, based only on the evidence that has been presented to you in this trial.”).

31. In cases where the defendant appeals on the basis that there was “insufficient evidence” for the jury’s verdict, “the relevant question [on appeal] is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 309, 319 (1979). See generally Chad M. Oldfather, Appellate Courts, Historical Facts, and the Civil-Criminal Distinction, 57 Vand. L. Rev. 437 (2004) (criticizing unduly high level of deference given to criminal jury’s findings of fact). In most states and in the federal system, the trial court judge may order a “directed acquittal” before or after a jury verdict if he or she finds the evidence so insufficient that no rational juror could vote for conviction. See LaFave et al., supra note 29, at 1128; Fed. R. Crim. P. 29(a), (b).

32. See John D. Jackson, Making Juries Accountable, 50 Am. J. Comp. L. 477, 477 (2002) (“[O]ne feature that has remained constant amid the many variations that have taken place throughout the common law world is the jury’s relative lack of accountability to the legal system, the public and the parties in the case.”).


34. Id.
Second, the procedures of our jury trials are thought to insure against wrongful conviction. A jury may vote to convict only if the prosecution has proved its case “beyond a reasonable doubt.” This is the highest standard of proof in our legal system, and while there is much debate about its exact meaning, its signal to juries is clear: vote to convict only if you are sure that the accused committed the crime. In the conventional view, this rigorous standard of proof in criminal trials—as opposed to a lower standard, such as “clear and convincing” or “more probable than not”—reflects the high value our society places on convicting only the guilty. Indeed, in the standard account, the whole bevy of procedural protections for the accused at trial do the work of insuring that no innocent person is convicted. These protections include, but are not limited to, the presumption of innocence, the right to confront one’s accuser, the rules of evidence, the right to counsel and to silence, and the right to an unbiased jury. These rules may serve a variety of purposes, but their primary justification is fairness to the accused. Critics on the Right routinely criticize these procedural protections for letting criminals off on technicalities. Critics on the Left sometimes argue that

35. See, e.g., Jackson, 443 U.S. at 309 (“The Constitution prohibits the criminal conviction of any person except upon proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.”).

36. The Supreme Court has shied away from defining the standard with any great precision. See, e.g., Victor v. Nebraska, 511 U.S. 1, 5 (1994) (“[T]he Constitution does not require that any particular form of words be used in advising the jury of the government’s burden of proof.”). But see Cage v. Louisiana, 498 U.S. 39, 41 (1990) (finding Louisiana jury instruction regarding reasonable doubt standard unconstitutional).

37. Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 208 (1977) (“The requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt in a criminal case is ‘bottomed on a fundamental value determination of our society that it is far worse to convict an innocent man than to let a guilty man go free.’”) (quoting In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 372 (1970)).

38. See, e.g., Dist. Attorney's Office for Third Judicial Dist. v. Osborne, 129 S. Ct. 2308, 2320 (2009) (“At trial, the defendant is presumed innocent and may demand that the government prove its case beyond reasonable doubt.”).

39. U.S. CONST. amend. VI (“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right ... to be confronted with the witnesses against him . . . .”); see FED. R. CRIM. P. 43(a).

40. Each state system, as well as the federal government, maintains its own rules of evidence for use in criminal trials. The Federal Rules of Evidence provide: “These rules shall be construed to secure fairness in administration . . . to the end that the truth may be ascertained and proceedings justly determined.” FED. R. EVID. 102.

41. U.S. CONST. amend. VI (“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to ... have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence.”); U.S. CONST. amend. V (“No person ... shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself ... .”)

42. U.S. CONST. amend. VI (“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed . . . .”).

these protections are merely window dressing in a system that convicts 90% of defendants via plea bargain. But from either view, the grand procedural contraption that is the contemporary criminal trial is, in theory, a formidable bulwark against wrongful conviction.

Third, the adversarial nature of the trial itself militates against fact-based challenges to conviction, for the adversarial model treats the trial as a game with two sides. In this model, the prosecution and the defendant are the two players, the judge is the umpire, and the jury is ultimately the scorekeeper. The idea is that, so long as the rules of procedure are scrupulously adhered to, the outcome of the game is valid. The validity of the game is protected by the judge, who may punish breaches of the rules and outright cheating. In this model, the judge is no more interested in the outcome of the case than an umpire is interested in who wins a baseball game. Instead, the game is meant to be won on the skill of the players (the lawyers) rather than on an absolute notion of a “right” answer. In this adversarial model, the only legitimate challenge to a trial outcome is a charge that the rules were not honored, and thus that the game was not procedurally fair. To claim that the outcome of a trial was wrong—to make an innocence-based challenge—presupposes a view that there is a right outcome to a trial. But, in the adversarial model, to claim that a conviction was substantively wrong—wrong “as a matter of fact”—makes about as much sense as claiming that the wrong team won a baseball game. In the “game” model of the adversarial system, so long as all the rules were followed at trial, there is no such thing as a wrong outcome.

That these deep-seated features of our criminal justice system make innocence-based claims difficult to recognize is borne out by the history of criminal appeals and post-conviction review. Criminal appeals as such scarcely

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45. See, e.g., Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of John G. Roberts, Jr. to be Chief Justice of the United States: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 55 (2005) (“Judges are like umpires. Umpires don’t make the rules, they apply them. The role of an umpire and a judge is critical. They make sure everybody plays by the rules, but it is a limited role. Nobody ever went to a ball game to see the umpire.”).

46. For example, the trial judge may declare a mistrial, or an appellate court may reverse a conviction, on account of prosecutorial misconduct. See, e.g., United States v. Crutchfield, 26 F.3d 1098, 1103 (11th Cir. 1994) (reversing and remanding conviction due to prosecutorial misconduct). See generally BENNETT L. GERSHMAN, PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT § 14 (2d ed. 2007) (describing sanctions for prosecutorial misconduct).

47. This adversarial model stands in contrast to the Continental model with its inquisitorial judge focused on truth-seeking. See, e.g., Jenia Iontcheva Turner, Judicial Participation in Plea Negotiations: A Comparative View, 54 AM. J. COMP. L. 199, 231–32 (2006) (“In contrast to continental Europe’s criminal procedure, our system has traditionally been more concerned with ‘procedural’ rather than with ‘substantive’ truth. We are likely to accept the outcome of a criminal case as legitimate as long as it is reached in conformity with procedural rules.”).
existed in the federal system prior to the 1880s, and while most states had a variety of mechanisms for reviewing criminal convictions, appeals did not figure prominently as a mechanism for protecting defendants’ rights. Today, by virtue of statute or state constitution, almost all American criminal defendants enjoy one direct appeal as a matter of right after conviction. The main grounds for appeal are errors of law in the trial court—that is, assertions that the trial court misstated or misapplied the rules of the game. Although most jurisdictions today also recognize insufficiency of evidence as a ground for reversal on appeal, the standard of review for such a claim is so strict that such appeals are virtually impossible to win. And because appellate courts have few mechanisms for independent fact-finding, appellate judges are generally reliant on the trial record for fact-based determinations.

After direct appeals are exhausted, the mechanisms for attacking a conviction are all extraordinary and extremely narrow. The most famous of these mechanisms is, of course, the Great Writ of Habeas Corpus, which today is really a synonym for the whole system of constitutional, statutory, and common law post-conviction review. And while one might think that habeas would concern itself intensely with whether the prisoner is, in fact, guilty or innocent, a freestanding claim of innocence is not a ground for habeas relief. This is not the place to recount the entire history of habeas and its relation to innocence claims, but a brief sketch is warranted. Habeas corpus, a process recognized in the Constitution and, for all intents and purposes, codified into federal law, provides a remedy for prisoners who can show that their detention is “in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” From the mid-1950s until the mid-1970s,

48. See David Rossman, “Were There No Appeal?" The History of Review in American Criminal Courts, 81 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 518, 521 (1990) (“For roughly the first hundred years of the federal courts, there was no right of review in criminal cases.”).
49. See id. at 543–48 (providing an overview of the history of the availability of criminal appeals in state and federal courts in 18th and 19th century America).
50. See LAFAVE ET. AL., supra note 29, at 1256 (“[E]very state and the federal government provide[s] some means of appellate review . . . . In the federal system and in most states, statutes or state constitutional provisions guarantee defendants in all felony cases a right to appellate review.”). But there is still no recognized federal constitutional right to criminal appeal. Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 751 (1983) (“There is, of course, no constitutional right to an appeal.”); see also Rossman, supra note 48, at 519 (“As far as the Constitution is concerned, a state could eliminate everything but its trial courts.”).
52. For a discussion of the relative institutional competence of trial courts and appellate courts in fact-finding in criminal cases, see Oldfather, supra note 31, at 444–49.
55. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) (2006) (providing relief to state prisoners convicted or sentenced “in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States”). For federal prisoners, the analogous statute is 28 U.S.C. § 2255(a) (providing relief to federal
the scope of habeas review and the grounds for habeas relief grew dramatically as the Warren Court constitutionalized more and more areas of criminal procedure. But as habeas expanded, critics began to argue that it was undermining the value of finality, vitiating the norm of federalism, and becoming too unwieldy, expensive, and time-consuming.

In this atmosphere, Judge Henry Friendly wrote an influential article arguing that only prisoners with a “colorable claim of innocence” should be able to attack their convictions collaterally. And he directly challenged “the assumption that simply because a claim can be characterized as ‘constitutional,’ it should necessarily constitute a basis for collateral attack.” Judge Friendly’s arguments were rooted in his concern that the process of post-conviction review had become too cumbersome, with too many grounds for relief, and too much procedural rigmarole. His call for a greater emphasis on actual innocence over procedural violations would, he thought, dramatically cut down on the number of habeas claims and, at the same time, focus attention on the most deserving petitioners. His views were immensely influential in academia and, to a certain extent, in the judiciary.

The Burger Court (1969 to 1986) “flirted incessantly” with the idea of making guilt-or-innocence the lodestar of habeas review. For instance, it refused to extend habeas relief to prisoners whose convictions rested on evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment, in part because such an extension of the exclusionary rule would deflect attention away from “the ultimate question of guilt or innocence that should be the central concern in a criminal proceeding.” But, as Professor Michael Seidman argued, despite its rhetoric, the Burger Court “in fact firmly committed itself to a process-oriented approach in which result played a decidedly secondary role.” And when the push to reform habeas finally reached critical mass in Congress in the mid-1990s, the resulting legislation did nothing to focus attention on the guilt or innocence of petitioners, but instead erected further

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56. See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, The Supreme Court, 1988 Term – Foreword: The Vanishing Constitution, 103 Harv. L. Rev. 43, 55 (1989) (“[T]he Warren Court substantially expanded the availability of federal court habeas corpus review for prisoners who claimed to be held in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States.”).

57. For the two most influential articles decrying the mid-century expansion of habeas, discussed in more detail below, see Paul M. Bator, Finality in Criminal Law and Federal Habeas Corpus for State Prisoners, 76 Harv. L. Rev. 441 (1963) (focusing on the values of finality and federalism) and Henry J. Friendly, Is Innocence Irrelevant? Collateral Attack on Criminal Judgments, 38 U. Chi. L. Rev. 142 (1970) (focusing on the expense of collateral review and the irrelevance of actual innocence in federal habeas).

58. Friendly, supra note 57, at 142.

59. Id. at 156.

60. See, e.g., Louis Michael Seidman, Factual Guilt and the Burger Court: An Examination of Continuity and Change in Criminal Procedure, 80 Colum. L. Rev. 436, 456 (1980) (citing Judge Friendly’s article as “seminal”).

61. Id. at 448–49.


63. Seidman, supra note 60, at 449.
procedural barriers to habeas review. In other words, both the expansion of habeas and its restriction had nothing to do with whether habeas effectively picked out innocent prisoners for relief; rather, it had to do with shifts in consensus views about due process and federalism.

To this day, the Supreme Court has never recognized a claim of factual innocence as an independent ground for a writ of habeas corpus. The 1993 case Herrera v. Collins is still the Court’s most relevant opinion on point, and there the Court invoked the principle that “federal habeas courts sit to ensure that individuals are not imprisoned in violation of the Constitution—not to correct errors of fact.” Thus, “claims of actual innocence based on newly discovered evidence have never been held to state a ground for federal relief absent an independent constitutional violation occurring in the underlying state criminal proceeding.” The Court in Herrera went on to suggest that executive clemency is the proper “fail safe” in our criminal justice system, and that clemency—rather than habeas—is the “historic remedy for preventing miscarriages of justice where judicial process has been exhausted.” To be sure, the Court famously refused to completely close off the possibility that habeas relief might be warranted “in a capital case [upon] a truly persuasive demonstration of ‘actual innocence’ made after trial.” But in the sixteen years since Herrera, the Court has yet to find anyone who could meet the “hypothetical freestanding innocence claim” that it has scrupulously avoided recognizing or foreclosing. And in practice, that means that habeas litigants cannot bring a challenge based on actual innocence.

Despite this history, the last twenty years have witnessed an extraordinary number of exonerations due to DNA technologies—many have called it the most dramatic development in criminal law in generations—and this development has not gone unnoticed by our courts or by state and federal legislators. As the Supreme Court recently noted in Osborne, “[f]orty-six States have already enacted statutes dealing specifically with access to DNA evidence.” The federal

| 66. | Id. |
| 67. | Id. at 415. |
| 68. | Id. at 412. |
| 69. | Id. at 417. |
| 70. | House v. Bell, 547 U.S. 518, 555 (2006) (“We conclude here, much as in Herrera, that whatever burden a hypothetical freestanding innocence claim would require, this petitioner has not satisfied it.”). The Court has created an innocence gateway that allows some habeas petitioners to cure otherwise fatal procedural defaults if the petitioner can show that he or she is probably innocent. See Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 314–15 (1995). The innocence gateway created by Schlup only allows petitioners to overcome procedural default in order to pursue a claim of constitutional error: it does not establish relief or a showing of innocence. |
| 71. | Dist. Attorney's Office for Third Judicial Dist. v. Osborne, 129 S. Ct. 2308, 2316 (2009). Almost all states also have a generic new trial motion, analogous to Fed. R. Crim. P. 33, available during or after direct appeals. These new trial motions usually have strict and short statute of limitations—typically from sixty days to three years—and such |
government also passed the Innocence Protection Act of 2004.\textsuperscript{72} These statutes are all different from one another and difficult to summarize. On the one hand, they represent a significant response to the phenomenon of DNA-based exonerations, and they do open the door a crack to innocence-based post-conviction challenges. On the other hand, these statutes so restrict the type of claims that can be brought, the classes of prisoners who can bring such claims, and the timeframe within which such challenges can be brought, that they fail to provide the orderly mechanism for post-conviction relief that they promise.

First, almost all of these statutes restrict the availability of post-conviction innocence review to claims based on DNA testing. Convicted persons who have viable innocence claims based on new evidence other than DNA are categorically excluded.\textsuperscript{73} Second, the DNA testing necessary to mount an innocence claim under these statutes will itself be granted only if the petitioner meets a threshold showing of “materiality”—that is, a “reasonable probability . . . that the petitioner would not have been convicted if exculpatory results had been obtained through DNA testing.”\textsuperscript{74} This standard, already high, has been interpreted by many state courts to require “extraordinary circumstances” and is often used as an excuse to deny DNA testing when there is a hypothetical chance that DNA evidence would not be dispositive.\textsuperscript{75} The Supreme Court itself recently ruled that there is no constitutional right to DNA evidence, so denials of access to DNA evidence are difficult to appeal.\textsuperscript{76} Furthermore, many innocence statutes categorically bar claims from convicted persons who pleaded guilty at trial.\textsuperscript{77} Given the prevalence of plea bargains, such a restriction effectively makes more than 90\% of convicted persons ineligible for innocence-based challenges.\textsuperscript{78} Additionally, many states limit the availability of their innocence statutes to a certain subclass of serious crimes and to petitioners still in custody.\textsuperscript{79} In sum, the new DNA innocence statutes continue to present huge procedural barriers to whole classes of potentially meritorious challenges, and they fail to create a clear procedure for innocence-based post-conviction review.

\par motions must be filed in the court of original jurisdictions. Daniel S. Medwed, \textit{supra} note 9, at 676. These motions have the benefit of recognizing new evidence as a reason to revisit the underlying verdict, but the statute of limitations makes such motions effectively unavailable for the vast majority of potential petitioners. Additionally, it is the original trial judge who usually hears such motions, and the trial judge may be predisposed not to disturb a verdict yielded from her own courtroom. \textit{Id.} at 678.


\textsuperscript{74} \textit{Id.} at 1676.

\textsuperscript{75} \textit{Id.} at 1676–78.

\textsuperscript{76} \textit{Osborne}, 129 S. Ct. at 2321–23 (finding no procedural or substantive Due Process right to post-conviction DNA evidence).

\textsuperscript{77} Garrett, \textit{supra} note 73, at 1679–80.

\textsuperscript{78} See Bibas note 44, at 1150 n.330 (estimating a plea bargain rate of 91\% for guilty verdicts).

\textsuperscript{79} Garrett, \textit{supra} note 73, at 1679–80; \textit{see also} \textit{id.} at 1719 (chart describing limitations imposed by different state innocence statutes).
II. INNOCENCE COMMISSIONS AND THE NORTH CAROLINA APPROACH

Because of our system’s deep-seated aversion to innocence-based post-conviction review, some states are now looking at the more novel idea of independent commissions dedicated to post-conviction factual review. An innocence commission could take many different forms, but the essential idea is that of an independent commission with the power to (a) investigate the factual basis of existing convictions and (b) refer worthy cases to a judicial panel with the power to vacate the conviction. This Part summarizes the history of the innocence commission idea and describes how the only functioning innocence commission in the United States—the NCIIC—operates.

A. The British Criminal Cases Review Commission

The first innocence commission of the type contemplated in this Article was instituted in the United Kingdom. Why the U.K., a country with a similar legal system to the United States and with whom we share much legal history, came to adopt the commission approach earlier than any American jurisdiction is an interesting story. After all, worries about false convictions, particularly in death penalty cases, have been a point of concern in the United States since at least the 1930s, while the issue became salient in the U.K. only in the 1980s around the height of the Irish Troubles. A significant difference between the two legal systems, however, is that appeals and post-conviction review were traditionally available even less in the U.K. than in American jurisdictions. Before the Criminal Justice Act of 1995, people convicted of crimes in the U.K. had one appeal available pursuant to the Criminal Appeal Act of 1907, and no collateral review procedures were available. The only mechanism for reviewing final convictions was a discretionary review by the Home Secretary, who had the authority to refer extraordinary cases to the Court of Appeal if he determined that a miscarriage of justice may have occurred. But the Home Secretary rarely invoked his power to refer cases. In the British system, the Home Secretary is responsible

80. See, e.g., Edwin M. Borchard, Convicting the Innocent: Sixty-Five Actual Errors of Criminal Justice (1932) (summarizing sixty-five cases of innocents convicted and suggesting legal reform to combat such miscarriages of justice).


82. In the U.K., regular criminal appeals did not exist until the Criminal Appeal Act of 1907, and even then, the appellate courts interpreted their mandate narrowly. Siobhan M. Keegan, The Criminal Cases Review Commission’s Effectiveness in Handling Cases from Northern Ireland, 22 Fordham Int’l L.J. 1776, 1787–88 (1999).


84. See ROYAL COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 83, at 180.

85. Id. at 181.
for law and order and the national police force. He or she has almost no incentive to appear “soft on crime” by prompting the reconsideration of final convictions. Ironically, then, the British adoption of the commission approach can be traced to its very “backwardness” in the domain of post-conviction review prior to the 1990s.

A number of high-profile exonerations in the 1980s and 1990s raised concerns in the U.K. about the prevalence of wrongful convictions and the paucity of mechanisms to correct them. In particular, the case of the Birmingham Six—six Irish men falsely convicted of bombing a pub in Birmingham—galvanized public opinion when their convictions were overturned in 1991. In response, the British Home Secretary created a blue-ribbon panel, the Royal Commission on Criminal Justice, and charged it with the task of examining the causes of wrongful convictions and recommending better procedures for dealing with such miscarriages of justice.

Under then-existing British law, the only post-conviction review mechanism available when substantial new evidence came to light was the authority of the Home Secretary to refer cases to the Court of Appeal. The Home Secretary could refer cases only if he or she determined that a miscarriage of justice may have taken place. The Royal Commission found that the Home Secretary was ill-suited to the task of post-conviction review because of structural contradictions. Because the Home Secretary was symbolically the chief law enforcement agent of the government, with ultimate responsibility for the national police and crime policy, he or she was inevitably reluctant to expose failings or problems in the police and prosecution services. In addition, the Royal Commission noted the constitutional incongruity of having the Home Secretary, a member of the Government, functioning in a judicial capacity, as the arbiter of

86. Id. at 182 (“We have concluded that it is neither necessary nor desirable that the Home Secretary should be directly responsible for the consideration and investigation of alleged miscarriages of justice as well as being responsible for law and order and for the police.”).


88. See Kyle, supra note 81, at 657–59 (noting high-profile cases of wrongful convictions, including the Guildford Four, the Maguire Seven, and the Bridgewater Four); see also J. DAVID HIRSCHEL & WILLIAM WAKEFIELD, CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN ENGLAND AND THE UNITED STATES 151 (1995).

89. See ROYAL COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 83, at 1.

90. Id.

91. Id. at 180.

92. Id. at 181.

93. Id. at 182; see also Horan, supra note 83, at 112 (“Understandably, acting as ‘both judge and jury in its own cause,’ the Home Office was not ‘very eager’ to expose the failings or misconduct of its own police or forensic scientists in obtaining wrongful convictions.”).
legal relief. The Royal Commission found that the Home Secretary was aware of this anomaly in the separation of powers and felt reluctant to invoke his referral power for fear of unduly interfering in a coordinate branch of government. In fact, the Home Secretary had referred only thirty-six cases between the years 1981 and the end of 1988, an average of between four and five cases per year. Consequently, the Royal Commission found a real likelihood that miscarriages of justice might slip through the cracks, and it recommended taking the referral power away from the Home Secretary and placing it instead in a new independent Criminal Case Review Authority (CCRA).

As envisioned by the Royal Commission, the CCRA would be “operationally independent” of both the Government and the Court of Appeal, but would be required to submit an annual report to the Government. The CCRA would have the capacity and authority to direct police investigations—or, in some instances, conduct investigations on its own—into the cases under review. Only cases in which normal appeals were exhausted would be accepted by the CCRA. The Royal Commission proposed that the CCRA have the authority to refer worthy cases to the Court of Appeal, though the CCRA itself would not have the fundamentally judicial power of acquittal. Upon such referral, the Court of Appeal would conduct an evidentiary hearing and take any action it deemed necessary, be it upholding the conviction, quashing it, or ordering a new trial. Parliament adopted the recommendations of the Royal Commission in 1995 as part of the Criminal Justice Act, and two years later, a newly formed Criminal Cases Review Commission (CCRC) began operations. By law, the CCRC is headed by at least eleven commissioners, one third of whom must be experienced lawyers, appointed to five-year terms by the Queen upon recommendation of the Prime Minister. A group of roughly one hundred staff members, including about fifty case managers, perform most of the day-to-day functions of the CCRC, including intake, case review, and directing investigations. Anybody convicted of a criminal offense in England, Wales, or Northern Ireland is eligible to apply for review, though applications are not

94. See ROYAL COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 83, at 182.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 181.
97. Id. at 182.
98. Id. at 183.
99. Id. at 186.
100. Id. at 184.
101. Id. at 183–84.
102. Id.
103. Criminal Appeal Act, 1995, c. 35, § 8 (Eng.).
104. See Kyle, supra note 81, at 661–62.
accepted if the applicant is still awaiting a decision on his or her appeal.\textsuperscript{108} Cases that meet the threshold eligibility criteria are categorized into one of four categories (A through D) based on the complexity of the issues, and the case is allocated to a caseworker who will carry out the review.\textsuperscript{109}

The case review can take as little as a few weeks or longer than a year, depending on the complexity of the issues, and the case worker has the authority to direct the police to conduct specific investigations and to obtain documents from any public body.\textsuperscript{110} When the case worker has completed the case review, the case is referred to a commissioner or a panel of commissioners to decide whether or not sufficient grounds exist to refer the case to the Court of Appeal.\textsuperscript{111} The standard of review at this stage is whether “there is a real possibility that the conviction . . . would not be upheld.”\textsuperscript{112} A panel of at least three commissioners must meet before any case may be referred to the Court of Appeal, though a single commissioner may send out a provisional rejection.\textsuperscript{113} If a panel of commissioners decides that there is a “real possibility” that the conviction would not be upheld, it then issues a Statement of Reasons and formally refers the case to the Court of Appeal.\textsuperscript{114} At that point, the CCRC’s involvement in the case is usually over.\textsuperscript{115} If, on the other hand, a commissioner determines that a case does not meet the “real possibility” standard, then a provisional rejection notice, along with a Statement of Reasons, will be sent to the applicant.\textsuperscript{116} The applicant then has twenty business days to respond to the provisional rejection with any supplemental information or arguments. After reviewing any response from the applicant, the commissioner or commissioners will once again determine whether referral is appropriate.\textsuperscript{117} If so, the case will be referred to the Court of Appeal with a Statement of Reasons. If not, a final rejection and Statement of Reasons is issued to the applicant.\textsuperscript{118} There is no judicial appeal as such from a rejection, but applicants may challenge the rejection in court as they would any other administrative action by an agency for being “perverse or absurd.”\textsuperscript{119}

\begin{thebibliography}{99}
\bibitem{109} Id.; see also Case Categorisation, CCRC, http://www.ccrc.gov.uk/documents/CASE_CATEGORISATION.pdf (last visited Oct. 21, 2010).
\bibitem{110} See Roach, supra note 105, at 96.
\bibitem{111} How We Review Your Case, supra note 108.
\bibitem{112} Criminal Appeal Act, 1995, c. 35, § 13 (Eng.).
\bibitem{113} See Roach, supra note 105, at 94.
\bibitem{114} Id.
\bibitem{115} Lissa Griffin, Correcting Injustice: Studying How the United Kingdom and the United States Review Claims of Innocence, 41 U. Tol. L. Rev. 107, 113 (2009). The Commission does not represent applicants at the Court of Appeal. Id.
\bibitem{116} How We Review Your Case, supra note 108.
\bibitem{117} Id.
\bibitem{118} Id.
\end{thebibliography}
If a case is referred to the Court of Appeal, the Court has the benefit of the Statement of Reasons from the CCRC. But the Crown Prosecution Service has the right to defend the conviction if it so chooses, and the Court, sitting as a three-judge panel, has the ability to call a hearing and entertain evidence outside of the record. After such a hearing, the Court of Appeal has the sole authority to quash a conviction, uphold it, or take any other action it deems just. Such decisions are made by majority vote.

The British CCRC has functioned for more than a decade, and while it has endured some domestic criticism, it has won over many early critics from both the Right and Left, and its future seems secure. As of September 30, 2010, the CCRC has taken in a total of 13,004 applications. Of those, it has referred 445 cases to the Court of Appeal, which in turn has heard 411 of those cases. Of those 411 cases, the Court of Appeal has quashed 290, upheld 118, and has reserved judgment on three awaiting further hearing. In sum, the Court of Appeal has quashed convictions in close to three-quarters of the cases it has received from the CCRC.

B. Innocence Commissions in the United States

During the years the British were busy studying the problem of false conviction and creating the CCRC, the issue attracted scant attention in the United States. In part, this is because the 1970s and 1980s were a period of increasing crime and, not coincidentally, a period when “tough on crime” policies were popular with a broad swath of citizenry. American criminal defense lawyers and advocates also held out hope that the existing system of post-conviction review—what I have called the habeas system—could be used to guard against wrongful convictions. Three developments in the early 1990s changed the atmosphere in the United States. First, crime rates began to decline dramatically, taking with them the effectiveness of “law and order” as a campaign issue. Second, the increasing sophistication and use of DNA evidence uncovered numerous cases of

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121. See Griffin, supra note 115, at 114–15.
122. See Maiatico, supra note 19, at 1367.
123. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id.
128. See Mauer, supra note 127, at 10 (“In 1998 the FBI announced that serious crime had declined by 3 percent in 1997, continuing a six-year trend during which violent crime was down by 19 percent and overall crime by 17 percent.”).
unambiguously false convictions.\footnote{129} And, third, the Supreme Court’s decision in \textit{Herrera} shattered whatever hope was left that the habeas system could be counted on to investigate fact-based miscarriages of justice.

Of the three developments, the rise of DNA evidence has been by far the greatest factor prompting a new look at the efficacy of post-conviction procedures.\footnote{130} It has galvanized groups in civil society, most prominently the Innocence Project, to advocate on behalf of individuals and for systemic reforms, and these efforts have borne some fruit.\footnote{131} Practically every jurisdiction in the country has responded to the increasing prevalence of DNA evidence in some way, from new investigatory procedures, to new rules of evidence, to new criminal defense strategies.\footnote{132} As discussed in Part I, since 1997, forty-six states and the federal government have passed statutes making DNA evidence available, within strict limits, to convicted people with colorable claims of innocence.\footnote{133} And, in some states, the momentum for reform has gone even further, resulting in the establishment of various commissions and working groups to study the causes of wrongful conviction and offer recommendations, along the lines of the Royal Commission in the U.K.

So far, at least six states—California, Connecticut, Illinois, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin—have convened some form of commission to study the problem of post-conviction review.\footnote{134} The factors motivating these commissions and the exact make-up and mission of each differ from state to state, but they have all conducted extensive studies into the problem of wrongful convictions, and most of them have resulted in legislative reform or changes in law enforcement procedures. In Illinois, for instance, following a number of high-profile death row exonerations, Governor George Ryan instituted a moratorium on executions and established the Governor’s Commission on Capital Punishment.\footnote{135} In 2003, the Illinois legislature adopted some of the eighty-five recommendations of the Governor’s Commission, though many of the Commission’s recommendations remain unexecuted.\footnote{136} In Wisconsin in 2003, a

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\item 129. \textit{Jon B. Gould, The Innocence Commission: Preventing Wrongful Convictions and Restoring the Criminal Justice System} 16 (2008) ("‘The renewed interest in wrongful convictions was catapulted forward by the introduction of DNA testing in the late 1990s.’").
\item 130. \textit{Id.} ("DNA Changes Everything.").
\item 131. \textit{About Us, Innocence Project}, http://www.innocenceproject.org/about/ (last visited Feb. 27, 2010).
\item 134. \textit{See Innocence Commissions in the U.S., supra note} 16.
\item 135. Dirk Johnson, \textit{No Executions in Illinois Until System is Repaired}, N.Y. TIMES, May 20, 2000, http://www.nytimes.com/2000/05/21/us/no-executions-in-illinois-until-system-is-repaired.html. The Illinois case is unique in that it represented unilateral action on the part of the Governor and because its focus was solely on capital punishment. \textit{Id.}
\end{thebibliography}
Republican legislator and a former public defender together convened a panel—the so-called “Avery Task Force”—to study and recommend criminal justice reforms.\(^{137}\) The bipartisan panel successfully ushered a bill through the Wisconsin legislature reflecting its recommendations for minimizing the number of wrongful convictions.\(^{138}\) The California Commission of the Fair Administration of Justice, by sheer dint of the size of the state, had perhaps the best opportunity to effect substantial change in the American criminal justice system, but its success is not yet clear.\(^{139}\)

State commissions have usually focused on studying and offering recommendations related to the now-familiar list of the major causes of wrongful conviction: false confessions, eyewitness misidentification, false informant testimony, unproven or misused forensic technology, prosecutorial misconduct, and poor defense lawyering.\(^{140}\) There is reason to hope that the commissions’ recommendations, if adopted, will promote improvements throughout the criminal justice system—improvements both in limiting wrongful convictions and in finding the real criminal perpetrators.

None of the commissions I have described so far resemble the British CCRC because none of them had the mandate to investigate individual cases. In fact, the original North Carolina Actual Innocence Commission (NCAIC) resembled the other state commissions in that respect. As in the U.K., and in other American jurisdictions, the impetus for the creation of the NCAIC was a string of dramatic DNA-based exonerations of wrongfully convicted individuals in the state prison system.\(^{141}\) The driving force behind the creation of North Carolina’s commission was the interest and energy of the Chief Justice of the state Supreme Court, I. Beverly Lake.\(^{142}\) Chief Justice Lake, known as “a conservative Republican,”\(^{143}\) invited representatives from law enforcement agencies, the criminal defense bar, and legal academia to a meeting in October 2002 to discuss
the topic of wrongful convictions. The meeting ended with a commitment on the part of participants to establish a commission to study the problems they had discussed in depth. The Chief Justice took the initiative in setting up the Commission, applying for a grant of state funds from the Governor’s Crime Commission, and naming the members.

The NCAIC began operations in early 2003 with thirty-one members, representing all parts of the criminal justice system. Its overall mandate, similar to that of other state commissions, was “to make recommendations which reduce or eliminate the possibility of wrongful conviction of an innocent person.”

Its mission statement called for the study of a wide range of topics, including eyewitness identification procedures, DNA evidence testing, false confessions, discovery and disclosure, rules of professional conduct and “their interplay with innocence,” and post-conviction review of claims of actual innocence. It was the NCAIC’s treatment of the final item on this list—post-conviction review of claims of actual innocence—that has set North Carolina’s criminal reform agenda apart from that of other states.

It is significant that the mission statement of the NCAIC defined the problem of wrongful conviction with reference both to prisoners exonerated by DNA evidence and prisoners exonerated without DNA evidence. Consequently, the search for reform in post-conviction procedure was not limited to DNA-related issues, as it has been in so many other states. To the contrary, the NCAIC defined the problem broadly as wrongful conviction in general, and it quickly concluded that North Carolina lacked the necessary procedures and forums for reviewing fact-based claims of actual evidence. NCAIC members familiarized themselves with the British CCRC, and, after much debate, the members voted nineteen to nine in favor of proposing an innocence commission based on that model.

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144. Mumma, supra note 13, at 648.
145. Id. at 649.
146. Id. at 652 (“The Crime Commission is a pass-through agency supporting criminal justice from several federal sources that fund North Carolina law enforcement and related nonprofit agencies.”).
147. Id. at 650–51. The NCAIC included representatives from the judiciary, the governor’s office, the defense bar, law enforcement, prosecutors’ offices, legal academia, victim advocates, and members of the general public. Id. at 651.
150. Id. (“Exoneration cases in North Carolina include Ronald Cotton, Leslie Jean, Leo Waters all of whom were exonerated by DNA; and Terrence Garner, Charles Mansey, and Tim Hennis, whose exonerations were not based on DNA.”).
151. See Mumma, supra note 13, at 654.
152. Id. at 654.
153. See Maiatico, supra note 19, at 1357.
Voting against it were the victim advocates and a few law-enforcement representatives.\textsuperscript{154}

\textbf{C. The North Carolina Innocence Inquiry Commission: How It Works}

The North Carolina legislature passed the bill setting up the North Carolina Innocence Inquiry Commission (NCIIC) in July 2006, and the Governor signed it the following month.\textsuperscript{155} and the Commission began accepting innocence claims on November 1, 2006.\textsuperscript{156} While the legislature made a few changes to the NCAIC’s proposal, the bill set up a commission substantially along the lines proposed by the NCAIC.\textsuperscript{157} Specifically, the Act created a commission of eight members to be composed of one superior court judge, one prosecutor, one criminal defense attorney, one “victim advocate,” one sheriff, one member of the general public, and two people to be appointed at the discretion of the Chief Justice.\textsuperscript{158} The Chief Justice of the Supreme Court and the Chief Judge of the Court of Appeals share the power to appoint members pursuant to a formula described in the statute.\textsuperscript{159} The Commission chair is the one superior court judge, and each Commission member has equal voting weight.\textsuperscript{160} In addition, the Commission is empowered to hire—and has hired—an executive director and other staff to carry out day-to-day administrative, investigatory, recordkeeping, and other tasks.\textsuperscript{161}

All claims addressed to the Commission must be from, or on behalf of, a living person who was convicted of a felony in a North Carolina state court, and who claims that he or she is completely factually innocent of the crime for which he or she was convicted.\textsuperscript{162} The statute defines a “claim of factual innocence” as a claim “asserting the complete innocence of any criminal responsibility for the felony for which the person was convicted and for any other reduced level of criminal responsibility relating to the crime, and for which there is some credible, verifiable evidence of innocence that has not previously been presented at trial or considered at a hearing granted through postconviction relief.”\textsuperscript{163}

The threshold criteria implied by those definitions are as follows:

1. The Commission will not inquire into claims on behalf of deceased individuals;

2. Only convictions for felonies, and not for misdemeanors, are subject to commission review;

\textsuperscript{154} Telephone Interview with Richard Rosen, Professor of Law, Univ. of N.C. Sch. of Law (July 20, 2009) (notes on file with author).

\textsuperscript{155} See Maiatico, supra note 19, at 1358.


\textsuperscript{157} See Maiatico, supra note 19, at 1358–59.

\textsuperscript{158} N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1463(a) (2010).

\textsuperscript{159} Id.

\textsuperscript{160} § 15A-1463(c).

\textsuperscript{161} Id. § 15A-1465(a)-(b).

\textsuperscript{162} See id. § 15A-1460(1).

\textsuperscript{163} Id.
(3) Only convictions handed down by the General Court of Justice of the State of North Carolina are subject to review;

(4) Claims of constitutional, legal, or procedural defects in the process leading to conviction are not subject to Commission review; only claims of factual innocence will be entertained;

(5) The petitioner must present “credible, verifiable evidence of innocence” that was not presented at trial or at a relevant post-conviction review hearing; and

(6) Only claims of complete factual innocence will be reviewed, meaning that applicants must claim that they are innocent of the offense for which they were convicted and for any other criminal offenses related to the same crime.\textsuperscript{164}

In addition to the appointed commissioners, the Commission is composed of an executive director and a staff of five.\textsuperscript{165} The total budget for the Commission is roughly $375,000 per year, and the Commission has also received an additional federal grant of $570,000 to improve DNA testing.\textsuperscript{166}

The executive director and staff of the Commission utilize the six criteria noted above to screen applications for review. In addition, before the Commission staff will begin any review of the case, the convicted person must give consent for the review and fill out a questionnaire. Many convicted persons fail to return the consent form and the initial questionnaire.\textsuperscript{167} Before launching a “formal inquiry,” the Commission staff gathers relevant legal documents and background information about the case, and may even do some preliminary factual investigation, to determine whether the application meets the criteria.\textsuperscript{168} The vast majority of claims are rejected before a formal inquiry begins because the application fails to meet one or more criteria.\textsuperscript{169} In such cases, the claim is rejected, and no further action is taken. A rejected applicant has no right to appeal a rejection from the Commission in any court or in any other forum.\textsuperscript{170} As of March

\textsuperscript{164} See id. For instance, a claim that one is responsible only for manslaughter, rather than homicide in the first degree, with respect to a killing is not considered a claim of factual innocence by the Commission.


\textsuperscript{166} See Roach, supra note 105, at 103.

\textsuperscript{167} Telephone Interview with Kendra Montgomery-Blinn, Executive Dir., NCIIC (July 19, 2009) (notes on file with author).


\textsuperscript{170} N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1470(a) (2010) (“[D]ecisions of the Commission and of the three-judge panel are final and are not subject to further review by appeal, certification, writ, motion, or otherwise.”).
2010, out of a total of 635 applications, only twelve (less than 2% of all claims) had met the criteria for “formal inquiry.”

Moreover, the Commission will not begin a formal inquiry into a case unless and until “the convicted person waives his or her procedural safeguards and privileges, agrees to cooperate with the Commission, and agrees to provide full disclosure regarding all inquiry requirements of the Commission.” The rights and safeguards that an applicant must give up include “the right against self-incrimination, attorney–client privilege, spousal privilege, patient–physician privilege, priest–penitent privilege, and any other type of privileged communication.” And the statute adds that “[i]f, at any point during an inquiry, the convicted person refuses to comply with requests of the Commission or is otherwise deemed to be uncooperative by the Commission, the Commission shall discontinue the inquiry.” In short, an applicant must waive rights that are taken for granted in the adversarial process, must pledge complete cooperation with the Commission, and must maintain such cooperation throughout the inquiry. Only then—and only if the applicant meets all of the other criteria noted above—will the Commission launch a formal inquiry.

Once the Commission begins a formal inquiry, it has the power to “issue process to compel the attendance of witnesses and the production of evidence, administer oaths, . . . and prescribe its own rules of procedure.” In addition, it can obtain information through any of the procedures available in the Criminal Procedures Act or the Rules of Civil Procedure. A formal inquiry is not an adversarial proceeding. To the contrary, it is a Commission-driven fact-finding inquiry that has more in common with the “inquisitorial approach” of Continental civil law systems than the adversarial approach of the traditional Anglo-American trial. The Commission staff drives the process, searching for and compelling disclosure of information as it sees fit. There is no role for the prosecutor or for an applicant’s counsel in the formal inquiry process; they must remain on the sidelines. And in sharp contrast to the public nature of a criminal trial, none of the records or proceedings of the Commission are subject to the public record and


172. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1467(b) (2010).


174. § 15A-1467(g).

175. § 15A-1467(d).

176. Id.

177. In the summer of 2009, the legislature granted the Commission the power to compel testimony from witnesses and to offer limited immunity in exchange for such testimony. Act of July 27, 2009, 2009 N.C. Sess. Laws 360 (codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1468(a1) (2010)).
public meeting laws. Indeed, all such records and proceedings are confidential, with the sole exception that if the Commission votes to refer the case to a special three-judge panel, then all supporting records, files, and transcripts of hearings will become public.

When a formal inquiry comes to an end, the commissioners hold hearings—public or private, at their discretion—to determine whether “there is sufficient evidence of factual innocence to merit judicial review.” At the end of the hearing, all eight commissioners vote, and in order for the case to clear the Commission and go on to judicial review, five or more commissioners must vote in favor of referral. If the convicted person pleaded guilty at trial, however, then all eight commissioners must unanimously vote in favor of referral in order for the case to go on to judicial review. If the case does not pass the necessary five-person majority (or unanimity in the case of a guilty plea), the Commission “shall document that opinion, along with supporting findings of fact” and send those documents to the trial court and the district attorney’s office in the district of original jurisdiction. At that point, the case is closed.

If, however, the case does clear the five-person majority (or unanimity in the case of a guilty plea), the Commission will refer the case to the Chief Justice, who will in turn appoint a special three-judge panel to conduct an evidentiary hearing on the matter. Once in front of the three-judge panel for an evidentiary hearing, the process becomes recognizably adversarial again, with state prosecutors representing the state and the applicant’s attorney arguing his or her client’s innocence. The standard of review in front of the judicial panel is “whether the convicted person has proved by clear and convincing evidence that [he or she] is innocent of the charges.” The conviction will be vacated only if all three judges on the panel find that the applicant has met the clear and convincing standard of actual innocence. Anything less than a unanimous panel results in a denial of relief, and there is no appeal from the panel’s verdict.

178. § 15A-1468(e).
179. Id. In addition, if a formal inquiry uncovers evidence of criminality on the part of the applicant related to the case under review, then such evidence will be provided to the prosecution, and if a formal inquiry uncovers evidence favorable to the applicant’s claim of innocence, then such evidence will be provided to the applicant and his attorney. § 15A-1468(d).
180. § 15A-1468(c).
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. Id. § 15A-1469(a). The three-judge panel must not include any judge with “substantial previous experience in the case” to insure impartiality. Id.
185. See § 15A-1469(d). Even at this stage, the three-judge panel has the power to compel testimony from the applicant, and the applicant may not assert any privilege or prevent any witness from testifying. Id.
186. § 15A-1469(h).
187. Id.
188. Id. §§ 15A-1469(h) to -1470(a).
To date, only three cases have made it through formal inquiry to a vote in front of the eight-member Commission, and the Commission has voted only two cases through to the three-judge panel. The three-judge panel denied relief to the first petitioner referred by the Commission. The petitioner had challenged his conviction for molesting his six-year-old daughter. Since the trial, the daughter had recanted her original testimony, and she and her siblings testified that their grandmother had coached her into testifying against her father at trial. The three-judge panel in that case found that the applicant did not meet the clear and convincing standard of proof.

The second case to reach the three-judge panel was a high-profile murder case. In 1993, Greg Taylor was convicted of murder in the beating death of Jacquetta Thomas in Raleigh, North Carolina. The body of the victim was found near a truck that belonged to Taylor, and he was convicted primarily on evidence that blood from the victim’s body was found in his truck and testimony from a jailhouse informant. Taylor maintained his innocence throughout the trial and in numerous post-conviction hearings, but he had exhausted all his appeals and collateral review options by 2004. He filed a claim with the Commission, and after formal inquiry, the Commission unanimously voted to refer his case to the three-judge panel. The panel’s decision to refer the case was based in large part on the strength of new evidence showing that the victim’s blood was not, in fact, on his truck and that contemporaneous lab reports to that effect had been covered up at trial. After six dramatic days of testimony in front of the judicial panel in February 2010, the court found that Taylor had demonstrated clear and convincing evidence of actual innocence and dismissed his conviction. The exoneration of Greg Taylor raised the profile of the Commission and ignited new interest in its procedures.

III. Holistic Criticisms

The NCIIC is the first commission of its kind in the United States, and almost every aspect—from its inception to its composition to its procedures—can be fairly debated. In this Part, I will present and assess the most powerful holistic criticisms of the North Carolina Commission, criticisms that bear most directly on the question: “Does the commission model represent a real improvement over the

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189.  See Case Statistics, supra note 169.
191.  Id.
192.  See Locke, supra note 24.
194.  See Locke, supra note 24.
195.  See Locke, supra note 193.
197.  See Blythe, supra note 171.
status quo?" Not all of these criticisms fit into a tidy model, but for organizational purposes, I will group the criticisms into two broad categories: first, those from the Right and second, those from the Left. I use those terms colloquially, the “Right” representing a more conservative, law-and-order, pro-prosecution perspective, and the “Left” representing a reform-minded, proceduralist, pro-defense perspective.198

The fundamental clash of values animating most discussions of post-conviction review is the clash between the norm of finality, on the one hand, and the values of additional review on the other.199 The Supreme Court often speaks explicitly about “balancing” the interests served by finality against the interests asserted by litigants in additional review.200 Predictably, the more liberal members of the Court tend to come down on the side of further review, while the more conservative members favor enforcing finality. Part III first summarizes the general arguments in favor of finality before detailing and assessing the main Right-wing criticisms of the commission approach. Next, Part III summarizes the general arguments in favor of additional review before detailing and assessing the Left’s major criticism of the commission approach.201

A. Criticism from the Right: Taking Finality Seriously

Simply put, many on the Right will argue that the innocence commission approach goes too far towards unfettered review and does too much damage to the interests served by finality in criminal law. By most accounts, those interests include (a) judicial economy, (b) the aims of punishment, (c) general repose, and (d) incentivizing robust trials.

198. What I am calling the Right-wing perspective here is often called the Crime Control model of criminal justice, and what I am calling the Left-wing perspective here is often called the Due Process model. See Packer, supra note 25, at 163–65 (describing the Due Process and Crime Control models of criminal procedure).

199. Finality is identified with the Right-wing perspective, and additional review with the Left-wing perspective.

200. See, e.g., Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 438 (1993) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (“The Court sought to strike a balance between the State’s interest in the finality of its criminal judgments and the prisoner’s interest in access to a forum to test the basic justice of his sentence.”); McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467, 520 (1991) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (“The test for identifying an abuse must strike an appropriate balance between finality and review in that setting.” (emphasis omitted)); Kuhlmann v. Wilson, 477 U.S. 436, 452 (1986) (“Balanced against the prisoner’s interest in access to a forum to test the basic justice of his confinement are the interests of the State in administration of its criminal statutes. Finality serves many of those important interests.”).

201. My own view is that the clash between the norms animating finality and those that counsel in favor of increased review cannot be determined in any neutral, logical way. The values at stake on each side are legitimate, though they are largely incommensurable: there is no single meta-value by which we can judge when we need marginally more finality or marginally more review. I do not, therefore, propose to locate, through an exercise in logic, exactly where we ought to draw the line on the finality–review spectrum. But it is important to understand the equities on both sides of the issue to understand the costs and benefits of the innocence commission approach and to better understand the strengths and weaknesses of arguments on both sides.
Judicial economy—or “conservation of resources” as Professor Paul Bator called it—is, for many, the primary justification for finality. The basic idea is that our criminal justice system—indeed, any human system—has limited resources with which to fulfill its tasks and that all efforts should be made to wring unnecessary procedures out of the system. “[I]f a job can be well done once, it should not be done twice . . . . Why should we duplicate effort?” Professor Bator asked. Any incremental increase in review adds to the already overwhelmed dockets of courts, increases expenses, and takes away resources from adjudication of newer and more pressing matters. Without some very compelling reasons, the argument goes, there should be a presumption against dedicating more resources to disputes already authoritatively decided by the criminal justice system.

Second, many argue that finality is a necessary precondition for achieving the ends of punishment, no matter what one believes those ultimate ends to be. “Surely it is essential to the educational and deterrent functions of the criminal law that we be able to say that one violating that law will swiftly and certainly become subject to punishment, just punishment,” wrote Professor Bator. There must be some point at which a conviction becomes irreversible and punishment inevitable if punishment is to effectively act as any sort of deterrent or if any retribution is to be had. Moreover, an “endless reopening of convictions, with its continuing underlying implication that perhaps the defendant can escape from corrective sanctions after all” is inconsistent with the rehabilitative goals of punishment, which require the “realization by the convict that he is . . . justly subject to reeducation and treatment in the first place.” The idea is that all adjudication of the dispute must end—that is, conviction must be final—before the aims of punishment can begin to have any effect.

Related to the idea of finality-as-precondition for punishment is the idea of finality-as-repose. Repose is a difficult concept to pin down, as even its proponents admit. Judge Friendly described it as the “human desire that things must sometime come to an end.” Professor Bator spoke of repose as a “psychological necessity” and contrasted it with “perpetual and unreasoned anxiety.” A legal system is not fulfilling its social function if it fails at some point to put to rest the bulk of legal disputes, because society has a profound need to move on from such disputes. Both Judge Friendly and Professor Bator took pains to emphasize that repose is not just a fancy way to describe “mere complacency.” Rather, for both of them, repose is a state of reasonable

203. Id.
204. See Friendly, supra note 57, at 148 ("[T]he most serious single evil with today’s proliferation of collateral attack is its drain upon the resources of the community—judges, prosecutors, and attorneys appointed to aid the accused, and even of that oft overlooked necessity, courtrooms.").
205. See Bator, supra note 57, at 452.
206. Id.
207. See Friendly, supra note 57, at 149.
208. See Bator, supra note 57, at 452–53.
209. Id. at 452; Friendly, supra note 57, at 149. Implicitly, the difference between repose and complacency is that the latter indicates a general lack of concern about whether
psychological security, or closure, that allows a society and its members to “leave[] well enough alone” and “channel[] our limited resources of concern toward more productive ends.” While there is some overlap here with the idea of judicial economy, the emphasis of finality-as-repose is not on conserving the physical or monetary resources of a society, but rather its psychological or spiritual energy. On this account, repose is a society’s basic conviction that it has resolved past disputes and can now take on new tasks.  

Finally, some argue that a commitment to finality is part and parcel of a commitment to the criminal trial of first instance. First, there is the concern that trial judges—and perhaps trial juries—might not put a sufficient amount of effort into the matters before them if they think that they are engaged in mere “suggestion-making” rather than authoritative decisionmaking. Professor Bator “could imagine nothing more subversive of a judge’s sense of responsibility” than “the notion that all the shots will always be called by someone else.” The idea here is that the system needs to invest some decision-maker(s)—namely, the trial judge and jury—with sufficient final authority to impress upon them the weight of their responsibility. Any increase in the ability of the litigants to reopen the case post-trial necessarily diminishes the trial court’s authority and thus undermines its sense of responsibility. At the same time, there is a worry that the litigants themselves will invest less time and energy into the trial process to the extent that final decisions are, in fact, made at some later point in the process. “The prospect

justice is being done. Repose is a state in which one is fairly confident that justice has been done. Why the confidence that there are so few innocent people being convicted? Because the system is designed to err on the side of innocence. As Professor Geoffrey Hazard put it, “The presumption of innocence, the privilege against self-incrimination, the right to counsel, and all the rest of the legal protections given an accused are means to lead the system into regularly making Type II errors.” Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Reflections on the Substance of Finality, 70 CORNELL L. REV. 642, 651 (1985).

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211. The value of repose is most clear when one thinks of a crime victim and/or his or her loved ones. It must be terribly upsetting to see the person that the court system has already found guilty of the crime reopen the case years after trial and appeal. From the perspective of the convicted person (even a falsely convicted person), there may also be some psychological benefit to knowing that the “fight” over the conviction has, or will, come to an end. For it is only after that end-point has been reached that the convicted person can turn his full attention to other concerns in life. Finally, there is broad agreement that for many criminal cases, the sheer passage of time makes accurate determinations of guilt or innocence more difficult. Finality acts as a general bar against relitigation of an issue long after memories have faded, evidence has gone stale, and files have been lost. It gives prosecutors assurance that there is a point after which they no longer have to keep proving the legitimacy of the conviction. In this sense, finality-as-repose serves a similar function to routine statutes of limitation—it lets the legal status quo be so that everybody in the system can go on to the next issue.

212. Hazard, supra note 209, at 650–51.

213. Bator, supra note 57, at 451. Professor Hazard asked, “[W]hat if everything a trial judge does is in principle merely provisional, subject to approval by higher authority, both as to substance and as to technical regularity? In that model of system the first instance functionary epitomizes the low level bureaucrat . . . [T]hey are not treated like judges.” Hazard, supra note 209, at 650.
of relitigation,” Judge Easterbrook has written, “would reduce the effective stakes of the first case, leading to an erosion in accuracy.”214 Because the trial is precisely the procedure in our system best suited for thrashing out the issues at stake in litigation, especially issues of fact, parties to the criminal case should “concentrate their energies and resources on getting things right the first time.”215 The availability of post-conviction review, on this account, saps the urgency out of trials, and thus does real damage to the most important and most comprehensive forum of decisionmaking in the whole system.

I have laid out these conventional accounts of finality to show that a general presumption against increased post-conviction review is supported by a constellation of important social interests. There are real costs, both tangible and intangible, to reopening final convictions to review, and “second-guessing merely for the sake of second-guessing” is not a sufficient reason to create collateral procedures.216 A single focus on the norm of finality is not tenable, for the criminal justice system must also endeavor to meet other ends—among them, accuracy, fairness, and fidelity to constitutional norms. But for critics on the Right, the commission approach to collateral review runs roughshod over traditional notions of finality, and thus represents an anomaly in our criminal justice system. In the next four subsections, I will sketch the main finality-based criticisms of the commission approach and assess the strength of the claims.

1. All Post-Conviction Factual Review Is Categorically Unnecessary

The unstated premise at the root of the commission approach is that there ought to be some post-conviction mechanism available for reviewing a freestanding claim of actual innocence. An attack on this premise is the most fundamental criticism that can be brought against the commission approach, and dealing with this criticism entails entering into some of the most profound debates about the nature of post-conviction review. What are the purposes of post-conviction review, and what procedures, if any, best fulfill those purposes?

Professor Bator’s 1963 article Finality in Criminal Law and Federal Habeas Corpus for State Prisoners is a good place to enter the debate, for although the bulk of his article is devoted to the thorny issue of federalism,217 his discussion of the concept of finality has been a hugely influential articulation of the conservative position on post-conviction review.218 He began his analysis with the
observation that “the possibility of error” is “inherent in any process.” In order to escape this endless litigation, “the notion of legality must at some point include the assignment of final competences to determine legality.” This is a classic statement of the principle of finality—the notion that a functioning legal system must, at some point, come to a final and irreversible decision regarding the dispute. “Somehow, somewhere,” wrote Professor Bator, “we must accept the fact that human institutions are short of infallible; there is reason for a policy which leaves well enough alone and which channels our limited resources of concern toward more productive ends.”

Applying this view of finality, Professor Bator argued that “if one set of institutions has been granted the task of finding the facts and applying the law and does so in a manner rationally adapted to the task, in the absence of institutional or functional reasons to the contrary we should accept a presumption against mere repetition of the process on the alleged ground that, after all, error could have occurred.” In our system, it is the task of the jury to find the facts and that of judges to articulate the law. Thus, apart from jurisdiction, the only legitimate issue that can be raised after a trial is “whether the conditions and tools of inquiry were such as to assure a reasoned probability that the facts were correctly found and the law correctly applied”—in other words, “whether the processes previously employed for determination of questions of fact and law were fairly and rationally adapted to that task.” On Professor Bator’s account, then, a “failure of process” at trial is a legitimate reason for revisiting a conviction, and he offered the scenarios of a bribed judge, a mob-dominated jury, or a defendant tortured into

in the early 1960s, a time when the scope of federal habeas corpus was dramatically widening and the number of habeas filings was increasing. In particular, Professor Bator’s article criticized the watershed case of Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443 (1953), which held that federal courts had discretion to “redetermine the merits of federal constitutional questions [already] decided in state criminal proceedings.” Bator, supra note 57, at 500. He argued that Brown had imprudently (and ahistorically) expanded the scope of federal habeas beyond its proper bounds. See id. at 500–07. But it is Professor Bator’s more general discussion of finality in the criminal law that is of interest here.

220. Id. at 447.
221. Id. at 450–51.
222. Id. at 453.
223. Id. at 454. This is also a rearticulation of the principle of institutional settlement: “decisions which were the duly arrived at result of duly established procedures . . . ought to be accepted as binding upon the whole society unless and until they are duly changed.” HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW 4 (William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey eds., 4th ed. 1994). Professor Bator’s writings are suffused with the precepts of the Legal Process school.
224. Bator, supra note 57, at 455. This is another classic statement of Legal Process theory, which holds that it is the institutional competence of courts in providing procedural regularity that gives their decisions legitimacy. What legitimates court decisions, on this account, is not substantive justice, but rather the provision of procedural regularity.
pleading guilty as paradigmatic examples of “failure of process.” A “trial” under such circumstances,” he wrote, “is not a rational method of inquiry into questions of fact or law, and no reason exists to respect its conclusions.” But unless there is reason to doubt that the trial process was rational or fair, then there is no reason to think that any further process would yield any more accurate result. We can sum up the argument thus: determining guilt or innocence is the institutional function of the trial court; so long as the trial itself is fair and free of procedural errors, there is no reason to “second-guess” the jury’s verdict. A straightforward claim of factual innocence, untethered to any claim of procedural error, simply has no place in this part of the system.

Professor Bator’s argument against a freestanding post-conviction claim of factual innocence is logically consistent and pragmatic in its eschewal of transcendent truth and in its sensitivity to the role of existing institutions. But too much has changed since the early 1960s for that brand of proceduralism to carry the day. Perhaps in 1963, a hard-nosed Harvard Law School professor could bite the proverbial bullet and accept a miniscule number of false convictions as a tragic but inevitable product of any human system of criminal justice. But a contemporary defender of Professor Bator’s argument would have a considerably more bitter bullet to bite. The advent of DNA technology and the subsequent exoneration of more than 250 convicted persons has changed the terms of debate. First, the number of people convicted for crimes they did not have any part in—a number which may have appeared de minimis in 1963—now appears to be considerable. It is one thing to be serene about the possibility of a tiny number of innocent people serving jail time; it is quite another to know that hundreds of convicted people, including many on death row, have been found factually innocent.

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225. Bator, supra note 57, at 455.
226. Id.
227. Professor Bator’s position does not rest on any unwarranted belief in the infallibility of juries. He admitted from the outset that “there is no ultimate guarantee that any tribunal arrived at the correct result.” Id. at 447 (emphasis omitted). But, from precisely this insight, he argued, there is no reason to believe that a second review of a case is any more likely to result in the “correct” decision than the first review (i.e., the trial.). Id. Whatever system of appeals and collateral review we choose to set up, he argued, cannot “be validated by the assertion that it is logically necessary if the ‘truth’ is to be established,” for again, there is no “ultimate guarantee” that any tribunal or any process of review will produce the truth. Id. at 447, 449 (emphasis omitted).

228. Indeed, it is still the “winning” argument insofar as a freestanding post-conviction innocence claim is still not recognized as a right under federal or state law.
229. Bator, supra note 57, at 453 (“Somehow, somewhere, we must accept the fact that human institutions are short of infallible.”).
230. The precise number is, of course, unknown and perhaps unknowable. See supra note 2.
innocent and that many experts believe that those hundreds represent the tip of the iceberg. Second, the proposition that a later fact-finding inquiry is unlikely to be any more accurate than an earlier inquiry is belied by the power of new forensic technologies. In the age of DNA evidence, it is no longer credible to argue that post-conviction procedures are just as likely to result in error as trials conducted years before.

In retrospect, what Professor Bator failed to acknowledge or foresee in his argument is the way in which new and credible evidence can cast legitimate doubt on the verdict of the trial, quite apart from any procedural defect. One need not believe all the hype surrounding DNA evidence to recognize that it represents a powerful and credible forensic tool and that it can achieve levels of accuracy in identification heretofore impossible. But DNA evidence is simply the most dramatic token of a more mundane phenomenon: the appearance, years after the trial, of credible evidence calling into question the factual basis of the conviction. New evidence can take the form of new alibi reports, new videotape evidence, recanted testimony, and captured computer screenshots. Professor Bator’s discussion of finality did not consider any of these possibilities. As the North Carolina Commission makes “credible, verifiable” new facts a threshold criterion of review, it confronts Professor Bator’s arguments precisely at his weakest point—indeed, precisely where he has failed to offer an argument.

Today, we know that a relatively large number of innocent people have been convicted, and we know that contemporary forensic technology can yield dispositive information unknown at the time of trial. Moreover, many observers are no longer comfortable privileging procedural regularity and institutional competence over ultimate results. The categorical denial of any judicial relief to the factually-innocent-but-duly-convicted is no longer a tenable position.

2. Innocence Commissions Are Too Costly

Most critics on the Right admit that some mechanism for post-conviction factual review may be necessary in extraordinary circumstances, but will argue, on cost-benefit grounds, that the creation of a freestanding innocence commission—


232. Professor Hazard makes a similar mistake when he argues against Professor Resnick’s suggestions that more collateral review is necessary. “More words and more law, but no more facts,” he writes in evident disgust. Hazard, supra note 209, at 651. But the commission approach makes new facts the sine qua non of commission review and takes as its very task the uncovering of more facts about the original crime. Indeed, under the commission approach, no more law is brought to bear on the crime at all—only new facts matter.


234. Of course, it is not fair to criticize Professor Bator for not directly addressing the innocence commission model; no such thing existed in his lifetime.
especially one with such loose procedural standards—is too large an investment in additional review. The cost-benefit criticism comes in many flavors, but the basic claim is that the small-but-real benefits provided by an innocence commission are simply outweighed by the costs of the commission. The focus of this type of criticism is not the principle of post-conviction factual review, but rather its cost.

It is no trivial matter to set up, staff, and administer a new state commission. There is a selection process for commissioners, a professional staff to hire, office space to find, internal procedures to initiate—all the usual costs of starting a state institution. Moreover, the very job of the institution (factual investigation and research) is labor- and resource-intensive. So the start-up and operational costs are considerable. At the same time, the relative procedural looseness of the commission approach means that the commission will inevitably spend a considerable amount of time on unmeritorious cases. Indeed, the NCIIC has cast aside almost all of the traditional procedural bars to post-conviction review: there are no custody requirements, no statutes of limitation, no bars to successive petitions, and of course, no requirements to append a constitutional claim. The reason to be rid of these traditional procedural “gatekeepers” is that they prevent meritorious cases from reaching review on the merits. But the cost-benefit critique demands that each procedural liberalization cost no more in judicial resources than the value of the benefits it is likely to achieve in reversing wrongful convictions.

The cost-benefit analysis has additional bite if one assumes, as Professor Erik Lillquist does, that there is a “generally fixed” amount of resources available for or within any criminal justice system. Thus, the creation and operation of an innocence commission “necessarily shifts” resources from other sources within the criminal justice system to the commissions themselves. On this view, then, innocence commissions may not only fail a general cost-benefit analysis, but may also siphon off resources from more efficacious parts of the criminal justice system. Professor Lillquist, for instance, argues that the very existence of the innocence commission renders those professionals who take part in its proceedings—lawyers, judges, and other law enforcement personnel—unavailable to the rest of the criminal justice system. All that the commission does is take scarce resources and reallocate them away from more efficient and more important sectors—e.g., first-instance trials—to an untested and inefficient sector: the new commission. Under this more exacting standard, then, innocence commissions must prove not only that their benefits exceed their costs, but also that their net benefits are greater than the net benefits of other parts of the criminal justice system. This is a criticism driven by both judicial-economy concerns and a deep

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236. See supra notes 165–166 and accompanying text.
238. Id.
239. Id. at 909–10.
240. The most likely net result, Professor Lillquist argues, is an overall “decrease in accuracy” in the justice system. Id. at 909. Why? Because, after the establishment of an innocence commission, the legal resources of the state—particularly its human capital—is spread even thinner over the remaining cases it confronts. Id. at 909–10.
sense that the right place to focus resources is on the initial trial, when the issues are still fresh, rather than on collateral procedures.

There is, of course, some real limit to the amount of resources that any society can or should allocate to providing post-conviction factual review. The question is whether the innocence commission approach demands too much. Since its inception in late 2006, the NCIIC has cost the state of North Carolina between $200,000 and $400,000 per year. As of March 2010, it had received 635 petitions, processed over 460 cases, and referred three cases to the three-judge panel. So far, only one person, Greg Taylor, has achieved exoneration through the commission process. More than a million dollars spent for a single exoneration—at first blush, this record might suggest that the Commission is not worth the cost.

The problem with this mode of analysis is that, as rational as it purports to be, it cannot yield answers when both costs and benefits are denominated in anything other than dollars. In the case of innocence commissions, the costs are more than just the dollar value of the time and resources spent on operating the commissions; there is also the cost to the value of finality and the interests it serves. Conversely, the benefits are more than the dollar value of releasing an innocent person from prison; there are also the benefits to the values of accuracy, systemic legitimacy, and professionalism. There is no way to tally up the value units on either side of the equation and come out with a neutral determination of whether innocence commissions are worth the price. There is also no way to compare the systemic benefits of the innocence commission to the benefits that could otherwise be generated by spending the same resources in another part of the criminal justice system. No one doubts that police departments, prosecutors, public defenders, trial courts, and correctional facilities could all benefit from an injection of resources. But it is not at all clear that the same expenditure of resources currently going to the NCIIC would yield greater systemic benefits if it went to those existing institutions. The cost-benefit criticism demands a level of quantitative ability that is not only difficult but conceptually impossible when the units of measurement include values in addition to dollars and cents.

Additionally, the monetary costs of creating an innocence commission by statute are almost certainly lower than the costs of a judicially-created right to factual review. A court-based right of review would trigger the full panoply of procedural rights for the petitioner. The parties themselves would control the process, and the court system would have to endure whatever costs that the parties have a right to extract. The commission approach actually allows the legislature to

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241. See Roach, supra note 105, at 103.
maintain greater fiscal control of the entire process—from specifying commission procedures, to allocating budgets, to monitoring the commission’s efficiency and efficacy. And a new commission, created and funded by a state legislature, is likely to be more responsive to legislative concerns about cost than the already-existing independent judicial system. In sum, once there is broad agreement that some post-conviction factual review procedure is necessary, there is good reason to think that the commission approach is more fiscally prudent than additional court-based approaches.

3. Innocence Commissions Will Not Increase Accuracy

The spur for creating innocence commissions rests, in part, on the knowledge that trial courts sometimes make mistakes and that innocent people are occasionally convicted for crimes they did not commit. This knowledge suggests a couple of corollaries: (1) that the commission itself will occasionally make mistakes and find someone innocent who, in fact, committed the crime; and (2) that trial courts occasionally acquit guilty defendants. Critics of the innocence commission approach have seized on both of these corollaries to argue that the commission will lead to wrongful exonerations, and that it will do nothing to prevent wrongful acquittals at trial. Therefore, they argue, the commission fails on its own terms to increase systemic accuracy.

Some argue that there is a real danger that innocence commissions will lead to wrongful vindications of factually guilty persons, thus leading the criminal justice system even further away from accuracy. Indeed, on this account, innocence commissions may have real institutional incentives to find cases of wrongful conviction even where none exist. According to standard public-choice analysis, state institutions tend to do what is necessary to justify their continued existence. In the case of innocence commissions, the purported function they fulfill is to find innocence where the rest of the criminal justice system wrongfully found guilt. Thus, on this theory, the best and perhaps only evidence that the commission is doing its job is the actual finding of wrongful convictions. The commission’s promoters will be hoping that the commission exposes the kind of spectacular cases that prompted the creation of the commission in the first place. Politicians and judicial officials will all be looking for evidence that the money spent on the commissions is worth it; state legislators in particular need good reasons to continue to fund a novel and independent state institution. For the commission, there would be no better way to prove its worth than to expose wrongful convictions that the rest of the criminal justice system was unable to uncover. Consequently, critics can argue, the commission will have an innate bias

244. The commission model does not allow the commission itself to vacate guilty verdicts, but rather to recommend an evidentiary hearing in front of a specially designated court. Only the court has the power to vacate the conviction.
245. See Lillquist, supra note 237, at 908.
247. In fact, the exoneration of Greg Taylor led a number of proponents of the Commission to proclaim its value. See Blythe, supra note 171.
toward finding wrongful convictions whatever the technical burden of proof might be. 248 The result is an intolerably high risk of wrongly vindicating the guilty. 249

The risk that the commission would be biased in favor of leniency might be mitigated if its mandate also included the factual review of acquittals. But, of course, innocence commissions represent a “one-way ratchet”—they allow for review of convictions, but not for the review of acquittals. 250 Consequently, even if the commission succeeds in overturning a few genuinely wrongful convictions, it cannot succeed in overturning wrongful acquittals. Thus, proponents of this view would argue that commissions tilt the criminal justice system ever more in favor of leniency and betray their purported rationale of accuracy. Everyone agrees, of course, that the current understanding of the Double Jeopardy Clause makes it impossible to re-prosecute a defendant for a crime of which he has been acquitted. 251 But, the argument goes, if the animating principle behind innocence commissions is to increase the accuracy of the criminal justice system—to ensure that the labels guilty and innocent are properly assigned—then proponents of innocence commissions ought to be in favor of similar review of acquittals, especially where new evidence suggests that the defendant did, in fact, commit the crime. The lack of any serious push to create “guilt commissions” looks to some on the Right as an example of liberal hypocrisy—a simple preference for clearing defendants from criminal liability, rather than a serious concern for accurate law enforcement.

Even if the creation of innocence commissions increases the likelihood that a guilty person may be mistakenly exonerated for his crime, the chances of such a mistake remain infinitesimally small. Under the NCIC system, a petitioner must bring forward new, credible, and verifiable evidence of innocence that is so persuasive that it sways the initial NCIC staff member who reviews the case, members of the NCIC formal investigation team, five out of eight commissioners (or eight out of eight commissioners in the case of a guilty plea), and all three judges on the special judicial panel. All three judges at the ultimate stage must be convinced of the petitioner’s innocence by a positive clear and convincing

248. Indeed, the very name “innocence commission” suggests that the commission exists to exonerate the innocent. Note that the British commission is called the Criminal Case Review Commission in part to combat the perception that it has a bias toward finding innocence.

249. The possibility that innocence commissions will occasionally clear guilty criminals might be a stand-alone argument against them, or it might factor in to a more complex argument about the relative benefits and costs of the commission approach. Alternatively, it could serve to push internal commission procedures to be more restrictive than those adopted by North Carolina. In any guise, the possibility of commission error resulting in the wrongful vindication of a guilty person is one that cuts against any liberalization of post-conviction review.

250. See Lillquist, supra note 237, at 908, 910.

standard. Even Professor Lillquist, a commission skeptic, agrees that the chances of vindicating a guilty person are “fairly trivial.”252

In addition, the argument that there is an institutional incentive to find someone—anyone—innocent is belied by the actual institutional composition of the Commission and the incentives it faces. Even if one suspects that overly idealistic staff members might be inclined to push cases forward, the Commission itself has no inclination or incentive to refer unworthy cases to the three-judge panel. First, among the commissioners are a victim advocate, a sheriff, a prosecutor, and a superior court judge,253 each of whom have a stake in making sure that the interests of the crime victim, the prosecution, and the judicial function are respected in the process. All of these interests counsel against disturbing the conviction.254 Among the remaining commissioners, only the criminal defense attorney’s professional description indicates a skepticism toward guilty verdicts. But none of the commissioners has any incentive to push through an unworthy case. This is because the most damaging event that could befall the Commission or the reputation of the commissioners is precisely the liberation of a guilty prisoner.

The so-called “one-way ratchet” problem is an interesting point about logical consistency. But it is not an argument against innocence commissions; it is an argument for some type of post-acquittal review. There is no reason, in principle, why one could not both support innocence commissions and support some procedure to repropsecute those who were wrongly acquitted at their first trials. In this context, it is interesting to note that eight years after the creation of the CCRC, the United Kingdom began to allow some derogation of the Double Jeopardy privilege in cases of certain serious violent crimes.255 Where new evidence suggests that a previously acquitted defendant did, in fact, commit a particularly heinous crime, the U.K. now allows for retrial in some circumstances.256 Some observers see a clear thread connecting the creation of the CCRC and the erosion of the Double Jeopardy privilege in the U.K.257 As Professor Lillquist suggests, it would not be surprising if the demand for greater accuracy in the criminal justice system would focus first on those suffering for crimes they did not commit and, next, on those enjoying freedom despite their factual guilt.258 This simply shows that the value of accuracy is one that can serve (and slice against) both a Left-wing Due Process model and a Right-wing Crime Control model. If innocence commissions promote justice, then they deserve support—even if there are still other reforms, such as some form of post-acquittal review, that also merit support.

252. Lillquist, supra note 237, at 908.
254. To be sure, I am not suggesting that any of the commissioners act with bias—only that the Commission has been created in order to balance various interests, and some of those interests are better served with skepticism toward any change in the verdict.
255. See Criminal Justice Act, 2003, c. 44, § 75, sch. 5 (U.K.) (allowing for retrials under certain limited circumstances for cases of, inter alia, murder, rape, war crimes, and crimes against humanity).
256. See id. §§ 75–79.
257. See Lillquist, supra note 237, at 910.
258. Id. at 907, 910.
4. Innocence Commissions Will Lead to More Wrongful Convictions

One of the most subtle arguments against innocence commissions is that trial juries’ knowledge of such commissions will actually result in more wrongful convictions than would exist without the commission.259 This is because, as Professor Lillquist writes, the standard of proof at criminal trials—guilt beyond a reasonable doubt—is a “floating standard.”260 Trial juries in a world without innocence commissions interpret guilt beyond a reasonable doubt as a very high standard of proof; Professor Lillquist asks us to imagine it as 90% certainty.261 But in a world where an innocence commission exists as a back-stop for the defendant, juries will begin to interpret the “beyond a reasonable doubt” standard more loosely—perhaps, he suggests, at 80% certainty.262 Consequently, there will be a class of cases—those where the juries’ certainty is between 80% and 90%—that would be acquittals in a world without innocence commissions but that become convictions in a world with innocence commissions. Some number of those cases will be wrongful convictions, and what is more, those wrongful convictions are unlikely to be overturned by the innocence commission. This is because the commission’s standard of proof to overturn a guilty verdict is sufficiently high that in some cases where a jury found guilt to an 80%+ degree of certainty, the commission will not recommend reversal of the conviction.263 The net result is that there will be more wrongful convictions in a world with innocence commissions than without them.264

To what extent does the possibility of commission-style factual review make convictions at trial more likely? Professor Lillquist’s hunch is that juries are more likely to convict if they know that there is a “back-stop” commission.265 My own hunch is that the existence of an innocence commission is unlikely to change juror or jury psychology in any measurable way. An innocence commission is unlikely to figure into the minds of jurors any more than appellate courts, or the governor’s pardon power, or the remote possibility of habeas review. Each time post-conviction review expands, there are those who claim that the trial process suffers as a result. Professor Hazard once asked rhetorically, “[W]hat if everything a trial judge does is in principle merely provisional, subject to approval by higher

259. *Id.* at 908–09.
260. *Id.* at 908.
261. *Id.* at 909.
262. *Id.*
263. *Id.* Nor, presumably, would a special court vote unanimously to vacate all of the wrongful convictions that slip through on the now-lower beyond a reasonable doubt standard.
264. *Id.* This argument against innocence commissions does not, at first glance, appear to be an argument from the Right, but its motivating concern is for the integrity of the trial of first instance. In this sense, it sits comfortably with the constellation of interests served by finality—particularly, the concern that additional procedures inevitably reduce the prestige, power, and accuracy of the criminal trial itself.
265. *Id.* at 908 (“From a juror’s perspective, the existence of innocence commissions may serve to lower the costs of erroneous convictions. As a result, jurors may lower the amount of proof they require.”).
authority, both as to substance and as to technical regularity.\footnote{Hazard, supra note 209, at 650. Professor Hazard suggests that, in such a world of overbearing review, state court trial judges will no longer act “like judges” because “they are not treated like judges.” Id.} Though the question was rhetorical, there is in fact very little evidence, statistical or anecdotal, that the expansions of appellate and post-conviction review of the past seventy years have led to any diminution in the quality of trials or of judging or jury fact-finding. Professor Lillquist relies on a few empirical studies for the proposition that “beyond a reasonable doubt” is a floating standard,\footnote{See Erik Lillquist, Recasting Reasonable Doubt: Decision Theory and the Virtues of Variability, 36 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 85, 118–30 (2002), cited with approval in Lillquist, supra note 237, at 908 n.63.} but there is no data to support the proposition that the availability of commission-like review will actually warp that standard. Still, Professor Lillquist’s hypothesis suggests that the rate of conviction and, to the extent possible, the behavior of juries ought to be monitored in North Carolina to help determine whether the Commission has, in fact, resulted in perceptible changes in jury behavior. No such studies exist at present. Professor Lillquist’s argument is a potent reminder that criminal justice reformers ought to think many steps ahead to insure that accuracy-enhancing procedures at the post-conviction review stage do not backfire and increase miscarriages of justice at earlier stages of the criminal process (e.g., at trial). But the argument that innocence commissions will so warp jury behavior as to actually increase wrongful convictions is, at this point, merely speculative.

B. Criticism from the Left: The Value of Innocence Review

The interest of a convicted person in access to factual review is clear: depending on the sanction he is enduring, his very life, liberty, property, reputation, and social status are at stake. Criminal conviction results in both direct criminal sanctions—the death penalty, incarceration, fines, restitution—plus a host of collateral consequences from official civil disabilities to social stigma and economic dislocation.\footnote{If he is on death row, his life is at stake, and if he is in prison or jail, his liberty is at stake. See Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. 1, 8 (1963) (“Conventional notions of finality of litigation have no place where life or liberty is at stake.”). And even if he is no longer incarcerated, he maintains a considerable interest in vacating the collateral consequences of conviction—namely, the “civil disabilities” imposed by operation of law and the severe social, economic, and reputational burdens of conviction. See David Wolitz, The Stigma of Conviction: Coram Nobis, Civil Disabilities, and the Right to Clear One’s Name, 2009 BYU L. Rev. 1277, 1309–17 (2009).} It is hard to overstate the negative effects of criminal conviction on the life chances of a person, and as a consequence, the potential benefits of judicial “vindication” through a quashing of the conviction. The individualized interest of the petitioner thus always weighs heavily in post-conviction review cases.

Apart from the petitioner’s own interests, there are vital social values at stake in actual innocence review, most prominently the systemic commitment to accuracy. By accuracy, I mean the basic principle that only individuals guilty of committing a criminal act should be convicted of a crime. Here, the distinction
between conventional habeas review and the kind of factual review conducted under the commission approach is important. The habeas regime we constructed in the second half of the twentieth century serves the important social interest of ensuring systemic compliance to constitutional due process. But the social interest served by traditional habeas review strikes many people as abstract and technical; it is, in the end, about procedural regularity. Innocence review, on the other hand, is about the very substance of criminal justice: did the petitioner commit the crime or not? Innocence review signals a systemic commitment to the accurate sorting of the guilty from the innocent, which is the system’s very raison d’être. This societal interest in a criminal justice system that accurately sorts the guilty from the not guilty is hard to overstate. And it is visceral: everybody understands that the conviction of an innocent person is a profound injustice, while many people find it difficult to place a conviction based on a procedural violation in the same category. In the case of habeas, citizens are asked to accept a diminution in finality for an abstract commitment to the procedural norms of the system. In the case of innocence review, citizens are asked to accept a diminution in finality for a commitment to the factual accuracy of convictions.

Innocence review also serves values beyond accuracy. Every time a new process of review becomes available, a diffusion of power results. Some level of diffusion is important to check concentrations that strike one as problematic throughout the judicial system. For instance, lay juries serve to check the power of the professional judiciary, appellate courts check the power of trial judges, and multimember panels check the power of any single judge or justice. The institution that the innocence commission checks is the jury, the primary fact-finder in our criminal trial process. No other institution has the fact-finding mission of the jury, and judges are reluctant—in doctrine and in fact—to second-guess juries on pure issues of fact. Commission review, which is limited to precisely the kind of fact-finding traditionally vested in juries, thus marginally reduces and diffuses the power of trial court juries. Of course, this diminution in the power of the jury is itself controversial, but it reflects a general belief that “the involvement of more people will yield better results” and will diffuse concentrations of power. Thus, one more value promoted by innocence commissions is the marginal diffusion and reallocation of institutional power currently held by trial court juries.

Additionally, the commission system reflects a commitment to the values of expertise and professionalism. Again, the contrast with lay juries is instructive. Unlike lay jurors, who are expected to be amateurs in the criminal justice system, staff and commissioners of innocence commissions are chosen precisely for their experience with and expertise in criminal justice issues. The North Carolina statute, for instance, specifically requires that the Commission include a judge, a prosecutor, a defense attorney, a sheriff, and a victim’s advocate.

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270. See discussion supra Part I.
271. Lay juries themselves play a power-diffusing role vis-à-vis judges. See Resnick, supra note 269, at 851 (“[I]n the case of juries, judges must yield to the voice of the ‘people.’”).
272. Resnick, supra note 269, at 848.
requirement reflects a desire to have diverse views on the panel, but also a desire to have criminal justice professionals make the ultimate decision about whether to refer cases or not. The statute also provides for a director and associated staff to “assist the Commission in developing rules and standards for cases accepted for review, coordinate investigation of cases accepted for review, maintain records for all case investigations,” and other tasks.274 In short, the commission system reflects the dominant values of the administrative state more generally: deference to subject-matter expertise, an ethic of professionalism, and the agency’s discretion to create internal rules, standards, and procedures consistent with the purposes of the authorizing legislation.275

Finally, there is the symbolic value of a criminal justice system that is willing to subject its own factual conclusions to systemic review. We might call this the norm of humility, or openness to self-correction, and it is the counterpart to Professor Bator’s description of “repose.” He correctly pointed to a general social desire for repose as a reason for finality, and he described repose as a precondition for forward-looking action.276 Because of the unique power of the government in the area of criminal law to imprison and to put citizens to death, there is a corresponding social desire for assurance that the state has exercised its power justly. We feel the heavy weight of state coercion in criminal law, we know that the criminal justice system sometimes makes mistakes, and we want to be absolutely sure that the people we deprive of life or liberty are, in fact, guilty. Consequently, we want to instill an ethic of humility and self-scrutiny into the process. Commission review, which serves as a back-stop to the normal workings of the criminal justice system, signals to citizens that the state realizes the court system may occasionally reach the wrong verdict and has therefore established a comprehensive procedure for self-correction. Just as Professor Bator took pains to distinguish “repose” from “mere complacency,”277 I want to take pains to distinguish openness to self-correction from what Professor Bator called “perpetual and unreasoned anxiety.”278 Humility or self-scrutiny is the frank admission that the normal workings of the courts sometimes result in miscarriages of justice and that we should be open to some degree to reviewing such claims. This is not an “unreasoned anxiety,” but rather an honest recognition that many exonerations have taken place in the past fifteen years, combined with a determination to mitigate further miscarriages of justice. To use Professor Bator’s vocabulary, our repose has been upset by the revelation that hundreds of factually innocent people have been convicted and imprisoned by our court system. A bout

274. Id. § 15A-1465(a).
275. See, e.g., Robert L. Rabin, *Federal Regulation in Historical Perspective*, 38 Stan. L. Rev. 1189, 1191–97 (1986) (describing the trend for courts to accommodate themselves to administrative discretion based on expertise). This model is now the standard way our states and federal government administer regulatory programs and adjudicate administrative disputes; it is still novel in the criminal law.
276. See Bator, *supra* note 57, at 452–53.
277. Id. at 452.
278. Id. at 453.
of self-reflection and a serious display of self-correction are now instrumental to secure the repose that Professor Bator calls a “psychological necessity.”

From the Left, the major deficiency of the innocence commission approach is that it fails to create any kind of legally enforceable right to make a stand-alone innocence claim in court. To the contrary, the commission approach buries claims of actual innocence in the nonappealable, nonjudicial process of an independent state bureaucracy. From this perspective, innocence commissions are simply executive pardon boards in new garb—unaccountable state institutions with absolute discretion to pursue or ignore miscarriages of justice as they please. Whether innocence commissions are able to actualize any of the values of additional review summarized above is, therefore, a doubtful proposition. Until factual post-conviction review is available as a judicially-enforceable right on par with constitutional review, the Innocence Problem will never be soluble.

The Herrera case, in its refusal to find or craft a stand-alone innocence claim in habeas corpus, looms large in the Left-wing discourse on innocence. One commentator memorably wrote that Herrera “ranks as one of those infamous Supreme Court opinions, like Lochner and Plessy, that is utterly repugnant to any basic sense of fairness.” The criticism of Herrera by legal academics and advocates for prisoners’ rights has been severe, voluminous, and continual.

What most Left-wing critics of Herrera want is for the Supreme Court to find or create a federal freestanding post-conviction innocence claim as a matter of right, just as Justice Blackmun suggested in his Herrera dissent. The precise nature of that right, and its textual basis, are matters of debate among commentators on the Left. Brandon Garrett, for instance, argues that such a right can be inferred (or created) from the Due Process Clause, the Eighth Amendment prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment, and possibly even the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial. It should be a “freestanding innocence claim that would grant relief to those who can show that, more likely than not, no reasonable jury would convict in light of the new evidence.” George C. Thomas and others argue on both efficiency and fairness grounds that the Supreme Court ought to recognize an innocence claim as a constitutional right based on the

279. Id. at 452. To be clear, this discussion does not assume that innocence commissions will actually eliminate miscarriages of justice, only that their existence can help reassure the public that the system is facing up to its revealed faults.


283. Garrett, supra note 73, at 1704–07.

284. Id. at 1638.
Mathews v. Eldridge factors. Even those who do not pin their hopes on a federal constitutional right to innocence argue that innocence-based review should be a legal right. Daniel Medwed, for instance, argues for wholesale liberalization of state-level procedures to allow for innocence claims based on newly discovered evidence. And Lauri Constantine, among others, proposes a model act for post-conviction review that “authorizes state courts to consider petitions alleging actual innocence” notwithstanding “any other provision of law limiting consideration of new evidence.”

The common demand from the Left is a right to a freestanding innocence claim in a court of law, and the commission approach does not accomplish that. Although the commission approach vests a court of law with the ultimate authority to vacate a conviction, it neither creates a right to innocence review, nor does it reach into the court system to change existing post-conviction procedures. Rather, the commission approach creates an extrajudicial body, unencumbered by court rules or by precedent, as a supplementary avenue of post-conviction relief. And as presently organized, the decisions of this extrajudicial body, the NCIIC, are not subject to review by any court of law. From the Left’s court-centric and rights-centric viewpoint, a petitioner’s inability to appeal the decisions of the Commission seriously undermines the Commission’s pretention to provide a serious new forum for post-conviction review. The new commission system, in short, does not guarantee deserving petitioners their day in court; it just gives them a new bureaucracy to whom they can address their grievances. These criticisms from the Left go to the core of the commission approach, for the commission approach is precisely about taking post-conviction innocence cases away from the courtroom and stripping out procedural barriers of all kinds.

One response to this type of criticism is to point out that the Left has simply failed to convince the Supreme Court that a freestanding innocence claim lies latent in the Constitution or in common law habeas corpus. While the Court has not technically held that no such right exists, the prospects for a judicial “discovery” of a right to a post-conviction innocence claim are slight. In both

286. See Medwed, supra note 9, at 661.
288. The Commission’s only demand on the judiciary is the rare empanelling of a three-judge bench to make the final determination regarding exoneration.
289. Under the NCIIC model, there is no judicial appeal available from a rejection of one’s petition; it does not matter whether the rejection comes from the Commission itself or from an adverse ruling of the three-judge panel. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1470(a) (2010).
290. See, e.g., Dist. Attorney’s Office for Third Judicial Dist. v. Osborne, 129 S. Ct. 2308, 2321 (2009) (“Whether such a federal right exists is an open question. We have struggled with it over the years, in some cases assuming, arguendo, that it exists while also noting the difficult questions such a right would pose and the high standard any claimant would have to meet.”).
291. See, e.g., Garrett, supra note 73, at 1699 (noting that “the Court may continue to dodge the issue for many decades to come”).
the federal and state legislative realm, the innocence movement has had some
success in the past fifteen years passing limited DNA-related “innocence” statutes,
culminating in the passage of the federal Innocence Protection Act of 2004. But,
as I detailed in Part II, these statutes have fallen short of providing a
straightforward path to factual review of convictions because they are constrained
by procedural and evidence-based limitations. In short, the innocence movement
has run up against a wall in providing more court-based innocence review. Even
those who dream of a federally recognized right to innocence review thus have
good reason to take seriously the more administrative approach that commissions
offer.

Moreover, a dedicated independent agency offers real advantages over
court-based procedures, advantages consistent with the values of additional review
that those on the Left should embrace.

**IV. ADVANTAGES OF THE COMMISSION APPROACH**

The relative advantages of independent agencies have been a matter of
debate at least since the Progressive Era. There is broad consensus that “agencies
offer an appealing alternative to courts” because an agency “can secure for itself
. . . whatever knowledge, analysis, or analytical capacity it thinks appropriate. An
‘expert’ agency, unlike a ‘generalist’ court, is not dependent for what it knows
about the world on the parties to particular disputes.” Moreover, “an agency has
a sustained, not intermittent relationship with the parties it regulates and the
problems put in its charge.” In the context of post-conviction factual review, the
advantages of a dedicated agency are considerable. Not only can a commission
sweep away procedural barriers to substantive factual review, the entire agency is
gearied to perform precisely the kind of substantive factual review that many on the
Left have accused the courts of eschewing. In contrast to an expert agency, the
court system appears poorly equipped to conduct the searching factual review of
jury verdicts that those on the Left seek. Appellate courts, for instance, have
virtually no fact-finding capacities of any sort, and even trial courts, sitting in
collateral review, cannot match the initiative, expertise, and investigatory powers
that a dedicated commission has. The NCIIC can, for instance, conduct its own
investigations, request municipal police forces to conduct investigations on the
Commission’s behalf, subpoena relevant witnesses, and offer immunity in
exchange for cooperation. All of these powers go far beyond the means that
courts typically have at their disposal and should hearten all those committed to
substantive review of jury verdicts.

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292. See supra notes 71–72 and accompanying text.
293. See supra notes 73–79 and accompanying text.
295. Id.
A. Dedicated Procedure for Fact-Based Claims

The fundamental merit of the commission approach is that it provides convicted persons with a dedicated “address” for post-conviction innocence claims with a minimum of procedural roadblocks. In Part I, I discussed the stifling procedural limits placed on petitioners who try to bring innocence claims to court through preexisting post-conviction procedures. A person filing a claim with the NCIIC, on the other hand, need not worry about a host of procedural barriers that he would face in front of a habeas court or other post-conviction forum. First, there is no “custody” requirement—anybody with a felony conviction is eligible to apply. Second, there is no need to claim a constitutional, legal, or procedural error at trial—to the contrary, the Commission has no mandate to address such claims. Third, there is no statute of limitations to worry about. Fourth, one may file a claim with the NCIIC even if one has previously petitioned a court for habeas relief; indeed, one may bring a claim to the NCIIC before, after, or at the same time as one brings appeals or other post-conviction motions in court. The only requirement of new evidence brought to the NCIIC is that it may not have been presented at trial or another post-conviction procedure. Fifth, there is no categorical bar to successive application to the NCIIC—if the petitioner brings forth new evidence in a subsequent petition, the Commission has the discretion to look at the case again. Sixth, DNA evidence is not required for relief—the Commission will look at any “credible, verifiable” evidence. Seventh, relief is available to those who pleaded guilty at trial, although unanimity among the commissioners is required in such cases rather than the usual five-person majority. Eighth, relief is available for any felony conviction, not only for certain high-profile crimes. And, finally, the Commission itself has fact-finding and investigatory authority far beyond that of any private petitioner, thus allowing for the development of a factual record greater than what would be possible by an individual petitioner in a traditional post-conviction procedure.

Critics on the Left worry that, in order to access this new avenue of relief, petitioners must give up too many of the procedural rights they take for granted in courts—including, among others, the right against self-incrimination, attorney—

298. A claim for habeas relief must be a claim that one’s conviction or sentence violates “the Constitution or the laws” of the United States. Id.
299. Since AEDPA, federal habeas petitioners face a one-year statute of limitations. Id. § 2255(f).
300. Federal habeas for state prisoners contains a strict exhaustion of state remedies requirement. Id. § 2254(b)(1).
303. Most state statutes passed in the past fifteen years to allow for some factual review are restricted to DNA evidence. See supra note 73 and accompanying text.
304. Many of the new state innocence statutes explicitly deny relief to those who pleaded guilty. See supra note 77–78 and accompanying text.
305. Many of the new state innocence statutes limit relief only to those who committed specific serious crimes. See supra note 79 and accompanying text.
client privilege, and spousal privilege.\textsuperscript{306} No other petitioners for post-conviction review are required to relinquish these rights—in particular, the constitutional right against self-incrimination. From a Left-wing perspective, petitioners claiming innocence should not be required to trade in their constitutional and common law rights for the “privilege” of proving their innocence.

But in the context of an expert agency devoted to ferreting out wrongful convictions, the requirement that petitioners cooperate with Commission investigations and give up some procedural rights is reasonable. By definition, a petitioner to the Commission has already been convicted of the crime that is the subject of inquiry, and the petitioner’s waiver of his right against self-incrimination “does not apply to matters unrelated to a convicted person’s claim of innocence.”\textsuperscript{307} Thus, the primary interest served by the right against self-incrimination—petitioner’s interest in avoiding prosecution or conviction—is not operative in the post-conviction context. And because the waiver does not apply to unrelated matters, the petitioner need not expose himself to liability for matters unrelated to the crime for which he seeks review. Mandatory petitioner cooperation with the Commission is similarly defensible in light of the petitioner’s role in triggering Commission review in the first place.\textsuperscript{308}

In sum, the innocence commission cuts through many, if not all, of the procedural barriers that keep courts from looking at actual innocence claims on the merits. Because such procedural barriers have kept meritorious claims of innocence out of court, the Commission approach represents a major improvement in the availability of factual review.

\textbf{B. Independent Investigatory Power}

The NCIIC has the virtues of an independent commission with broad investigatory powers. The Commission is independent in at least two respects: (1) as an “independent commission” existing between branches of government; and (2) as a neutral entity unaffiliated with either the state prosecutor or the defendant. It is not a judicial body, though the Administrative Office of the Courts provides administrative support to the Commission.\textsuperscript{309} It is not part of the executive branch, though it is a standing commission. And it is not part of the legislative branch, though the legislature created and funds it. Its activities are not subject to direct review by the Governor, the Chief Justice, or the General Assembly. Consequently, it is removed from both the political considerations that plague the executive clemency process and the hierarchical relationships that bind district and appellate courts. At the same time, the Commission is independent of both the state prosecutors and defense bar, and it is not an adversarial forum. Commission staff, rather than advocates of the state or the applicant, direct the investigations and develop the factual record, and the Commission has the power to demand cooperation out of both the state and the petitioner.\textsuperscript{310} Indeed, the petitioner must

\begin{enumerate}[\textsuperscript{306}.]
\item Cf. \textit{Mumma}, supra note 173, at 2–3.
\item \textit{Id.} § 15A-1467(b), (g).
\item \textit{Id.} § 15A-1467(b), (g).
\item \textit{Id.} § 15A-1462(b).
\item \textit{Id.} § 15A-1467(b), (g).
\end{enumerate}
waive all of his or her rights and privileges with respect to the investigation of the underlying crime before the Commission will launch a formal inquiry. \textsuperscript{311}

Moreover, the investigatory powers of the Commission are robust. It has the power to subpoena documents and witnesses, it can compel testimony in exchange for limited immunity, and it can use any means of discovery provided for in the state civil or criminal rules of procedure. \textsuperscript{312} In essence, it has the combined investigatory powers of the police, a grand jury, a district attorney, defense counsel, and a court of law. The existence of investigatory power does not, of course, mean that all investigations will be perfectly thorough or that they will all reach the truth of the matter. But it does mean that the Commission has the tools to function as a fact-finder with as few procedural barriers as possible. In its power and neutrality, the Commission functions more like a juge d’instruction in the civil law system than a judge or jury in the traditional common law scheme. \textsuperscript{313} The Commission’s independent investigatory authority coheres with the common sense intuition that a claim of factual innocence should be reviewed—at least initially—by an entity that has robust fact-finding capabilities and the potential to build up investigatory expertise.

\textbf{C. Ancillary Benefits of the Commission}

Because of its independence, robust investigatory powers, and authority to refer cases to the judiciary, the Commission has the potential to ameliorate the criminal justice system beyond the particular cases that come before it. First, its mere existence serves to remind law enforcement authorities that “winning” in front of a jury is not their goal; rather, bringing to justice actual criminal perpetrators is the goal. It is a truism that punishing an innocent person is a double injustice, but police departments and prosecutors understandably aim to secure convictions. To the extent that the existence of the Commission cuts down on spurious but easily winnable cases, that is a positive result.

Second, by bringing to light miscarriages of justice, the Commission may highlight specific areas in which the justice system can improve. The causes of any particular wrongful conviction may be heterogeneous and overdetermined, but many wrongful convictions can be traced back to a finite number of places in the law enforcement and trial process—e.g., eye-witness identification, indigent defense, or forensic science. \textsuperscript{314} After a number of years in operation, simply by doing its routine investigations, it is likely that the Commission will have helped identify where problems lie in the current system. Of course, generalized research into the problem of wrongful conviction is not the primary focus of the NCIIC. But it will inevitably produce a substantial and detailed record pertaining to wrongful

\begin{footnotes}
\item[311.] \textsection 15A-1467(b).
\item[312.] Id. \textsection 15A-1468(a).
\item[313.] The office of juge d’instruction is often translated as “investigating magistrate.” A juge d’instruction is a judicial branch figure responsible for directing investigation at trials in the French criminal justice system; the position is noteworthy for its independence from both the prosecutors and the defendant. See A. E. Anton, \textit{L’Instruction Criminelle}, 9 Am. J. Comp. L. 441, 441–43 (1960).
\item[314.] \textit{The Causes of Wrongful Conviction}, supra note 140.
\end{footnotes}
convictions through its findings of fact and supporting documentation in cases that it refers to the three-judge panel and its required annual reports to the legislature.316 The NCIIC’s annual report “may contain recommendations of any needed legislative changes related to the activities of the Commission” and “[r]ecommendations concerning the district attorneys or the State Bureau of Investigation.”317 The Commission may use its annual reports to offer broad recommendations to the legislature and to state law enforcement agencies regarding almost all aspects of the criminal justice system.318 At a minimum, the Commission could use its reports to aggregate and analyze information that would be of great help to reformers outside of the Commission. Through these reports, the Commission cannot help but serve as an agent of transparency for the entire state criminal justice system.319

Finally, the Commission provides an important legitimating function to the overall criminal justice system. Every system of criminal justice, as a human institution, is bound to make mistakes. The Commission is not going to catch every mistake, and it too may make mistakes. But the question is whether the system is diligent, honest, and self-confident enough to provide sufficient means to correct mistakes. By providing such means, the Commission signals to the citizens of the state that the criminal justice system is not going to ignore or sweep under the carpet blatant miscarriages of justice. Rather, the state seeks to uncover such miscarriages and right the wrong. After the cases of Ronald Cotton and Darryl Hunt, among others, revealed the scope of the Innocence Problem in North Carolina, the state’s demonstrated commitment to freeing the innocent is particularly timely and may go a long way to boosting the overall legitimacy of the criminal justice system.320

315. § 15A-1468(c), (e).
317. § 15A-1475.
318. Most likely due to staffing limitations and political sensitivity, the first two annual reports were fairly modest and did not offer any suggestions for systemic reform. See 2009 Annual Report, N.C. INNOCENCE INQUIRY COMM’N, http://www.innocencecommission-nc.gov/Report2009.htm (last visited Oct. 9, 2010).
319. For a sustained discussion on the potential tension between the individualized fact-finding role and the systemic reform role of innocence commissions, see Roach, supra note 105.
320. Former Chief Justice Beverly Lake told a local newspaper that the exoneration of Greg Taylor “restores the public’s confidence in our system.” Sheehan, supra note 18 (quoting former Chief Justice Lake, “If we find someone has been wrongfully convicted, we can’t give them that time back, but we can make it right. That’s a victory.”).
V. PROPOSED REFORMS

Up to this point, I have defended the Commission approach against systemic criticism from both the Left and Right, and I have offered an account stressing its advantages. In this Part, I will discuss several smaller-scale critiques of the NCIIC and suggest relevant reforms.

Every agency has to balance the goals of efficiently carrying out its tasks with providing individualized procedural fairness. The liberal critique of the NCIIC essentially holds that the Commission, as presently constituted, gives short shrift to individualized procedural fairness. I consider that critique specifically as it relates to: (A) checking the discretion of the Commission through judicial or internal review; and (B) recasting the petitioner’s requirements to present a reviewable claim.

A. Who Guards the Guardians? Improving the Commission’s Accountability

Like all independent agencies, the NCIIC requires a certain amount of discretion to complete its task efficiently, but too much discretion can result in a lack of accountability and a lack of procedural fairness to those affected by an agency’s actions. As currently constituted, the NCIIC vests its staff with too much discretion and too little transparency.

The executive director and staff members of the Commission have extraordinary discretion to dismiss claims at a number of stages. Before a formal Commission hearing ever takes place, a claim to the NCIIC must make its way through five distinct stages: claim initiation, claim review, further review, investigation, and formal inquiry. The executive director or a designated staff member is empowered to reject the petition at any of those stages if he or she determines that the petition does not meet the eight criteria for Commission action. In practice, this means that petitions are routinely rejected by a single staff member or by the executive director without any hearing in front of the Commission or the participation of a single commissioner.

322. Case Progression Through NCIIC Process, supra note 168.
323. The eight criteria that must be met for formal inquiry are as follows: (1) Conviction must have been in North Carolina state court, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1460(1) (2010); (2) Conviction must be for a felony, § 15A-1460(1); (3) Applicant must be a living person, § 15A-1460(1); (4) Applicant must be claiming complete factual innocence for any criminal responsibility for the crime, § 15A-1460(1); (5) Credible evidence of innocence must exist, § 15A-1460(1); (6) Verifiable evidence of innocence must exist, § 15A-1460(1); (7) Claim must not have been previously heard at trial or in a post-conviction hearing, § 15A-1460(1); (8) Applicant must sign waiver of procedural rights, Id. § 15A-1467.
324. N.C. Innocence Inquiry Comm’n, Rules and Procedures, art. 4(F), available at http://www.innocencecommission-nc.gov/rulesandprocedures.htm (last visited Mar. 8, 2010) (“The Executive Director or his/her designee will have authority to make the decision whether to reject a case, call for further review, or move a case into formal inquiry.”). None of this is meant to suggest that the executive director or staff members are incapable of carrying out their responsibilities; my point here is only to stress the large amount of discretion (power) they hold.
In addition, much of the Commission’s work is closed to public scrutiny. None of the records or proceedings of the Commission are subject to the public record and public meeting laws. Indeed, all such records and proceedings are confidential, with the sole exception that if the Commission votes to refer the case to a special three-judge panel, then all supporting records, files, and transcripts of hearings will become public. Hearings before the Commission are presumptively closed to the public. In sum, the Commission has no duty to give reasons for rejecting or denying a claim, has no duty to release its internal deliberations on a claim, and has no duty to hold open hearings. The combination of tremendous individual discretion and lack of transparency violates the very norms that underlie additional review.

Moreover, the NCIIC process currently does not allow for any judicial appeal of Commission decisions. In practice, this means that a denial or rejection of a petition at any stage of Commission review is final and unalterable. The unreviewable nature of Commission decisions is somewhat mitigated by the fact that petitioners are free to re-petition the Commission, but without any appeal mechanism, the Commission faces no accountability from any other source.

This lack of accountability is particularly problematic where the Commission issues a rejection before the stage of formal Commission review—which is the case in the vast majority of rejections—because rejections before the Commission’s vote stage do not come with any explanation of the reasons for rejection.

This astounding amount of discretion can be mitigated in at least two ways: externally through judicial review and internally through bureaucratic review. In federal administrative law, a party receiving an adverse agency decision usually has the right to judicial review, but only of a limited and deferential nature. If a denial from the Commission resulted in a de novo appellate review in a court of law, then the Commission would function as little more than a prelude to a court-based procedure. The idea behind judicial review of agency action is to subject the agency to review strong enough to ensure procedural regularity and

326. Id.
327. § 15A-1468(a).
328. Id. § 15A-1470(a) (“Unless otherwise authorized by this Article, the decisions of the Commission and of the three-judge panel are final and are not subject to further review by appeal, certification, writ, motion, or otherwise.”). This contrasts with the British CCRC approach in which adverse decisions are appealable to a court of law on the same basis as other administrative actions—i.e., with a “perverse or absurd” standard of review. See supra note 119 and accompanying text.
329. See supra note 294, at 747 (“If courts were to police agencies by assessing every administrative decision from scratch (de novo), any efficiency or other gains that Congress seeks by vesting authority in administrators would be all but lost.”).
legality, but deferential enough to ensure that the court is not substituting its own substantive judgment for that of the expert agency. Maintaining this balance is inevitably a difficult task, but even very deferential judicial review serves to remind agency actors that they are accountable. In the U.K., for instance, decisions of the CCRC are reviewable under a highly deferential “perverse or absurd” standard.332 This British standard is analogous to the “arbitrary and capricious” standard that governs much judicial review of agency action under the United States’ Administrative Procedure Act.333 Allowing for similarly deferential judicial review of NCIIC denials would boost Commission legitimacy and help ensure procedural regularity within the Commission at an acceptable level of cost in additional judicial work.

As for more responsible internal procedures, the example of the British CCRC is again instructive. Under CCRC procedures, only a commissioner can issue a rejection, not a staff member.334 If a commissioner determines that a case does not meet the “real possibility that the conviction . . . would not be upheld” standard, then a provisional rejection notice, along with a Statement of Reasons, is sent to the applicant.335 The applicant, in turn, has twenty business days to respond to the provisional rejection with any supplemental information or arguments. If the applicant responds, then the commissioner has an obligation to review the response and once again determine whether referral is appropriate. If not, then a final rejection and Statement of Reasons is issued to the applicant.336 This procedure forces CCRC staff members to present their reasons for rejection to at least one accountable commissioner, and it forces commissioners to issue reasons for rejection to the petitioner. In the provisional nature of the initial rejection, this procedure also mimics agency notice-and-comment rulemaking, allowing the most affected party one more chance to make his or her case.

The NCIIC would do well to adopt the CCRC approach to denials of petitions. Doing so would increase the transparency and accountability of Commission decisions, it would grant petitioners more “voice” in the process, and it would incentivize greater reasoned decisionmaking inside the Commission. It is true that the institution of such procedures will also increase costs and “red tape.” But the present balance of values is skewed too far on the side of agency discretion, and a modest increase in procedural fairness would tilt the balance back in the right direction.

B. The New-Evidence Requirement and the Standard of Review

Some may argue that the commission approach, as it manifests itself in the NCIIC, sets too high a burden on the petitioner to prove his or her innocence. The burden is two-fold: first, a petitioner must present evidence that is new, credible, and verifiable in order for his or her claim to survive the Commission
process.\footnote{337} Second, the standard of review in front of the three-judge panel is “whether the convicted person has proved by clear and convincing evidence that [he] is innocent of the charges.”\footnote{338}

Professor Michael Risinger has set out the most compelling case for a lower standard of review in appellate or post-conviction proceedings. Specifically, Professor Risinger argues for an “unsafe verdict” standard, modeled on the British standard of the same name, for the review of cases that turn on factual innocence.\footnote{339} The basic idea is that the post-conviction review of binary factual determinations ought to be particularly searching because juries are not very well-suited to making such determinations.\footnote{340} Under the unsafe verdict standard, a reviewing court will vacate a conviction if the court “entertains a ‘lurking doubt’ that the defendant was rightly convicted, or where the court is not ‘sure’ that the defendant was ‘rightly convicted.’”\footnote{341} The idea of this standard is to prod appellate courts—or courts sitting in collateral review—to meaningfully engage with the evidence and factual findings undergirding jury verdicts.

The unsafe verdict standard differs from the standards at use in the NCIIC process in two ways. First, under an unsafe verdict standard, the petitioner need not present new evidence in order to obtain a hearing or relief. Whether new evidence is proffered or not, the reviewing court needs to be convinced that the underlying conviction was rightly and securely entered. Second, while the unsafe verdict, like all standards, may not pick out a precise quantum of burden of proof, it undoubtedly falls well below the clear and convincing standard of proof required of petitioners in the NCIIC process. On this account, the burden should not fall entirely on the petitioner to show that he or she is clearly and convincingly innocent; rather, once the Commission has determined that there is real reason to review the underlying verdict, then the reviewing court must satisfy itself that the factual basis for conviction is “safe” before affirming conviction.

\footnote{337} N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1460(1) (2010). When the Commission votes to refer a case to the three-judge panel, the standard is whether “there is sufficient evidence of factual innocence to merit judicial review.”\footnote{Id. § 15A-1469(a).}
\footnote{338} § 15A-1469(h) (emphasis added).
\footnote{339} D. Michael Risinger, Unsafe Verdicts: The Need for Reformed Standards for the Trial and Review of Factual Innocence Claims, 41 Hous. L. Rev. 1281, 1282–83 (2004). While Professor Risinger’s proposal of the unsafe verdict standard was not made specifically in the context of innocence commissions, it is emblematic of a Left-wing approach to post-conviction factual review.
\footnote{340} Id. at 1307 (arguing that juries are not well-suited to decisionmaking “when the actual triable issue in a criminal case is the simple binary issue of perpetration, or a similar pure-fact binary issue”). According to Professor Risinger, juries are well-suited to the task of tackling “normatively charged polyvalent issues,” but not to making binary factual determinations.\footnote{Id. at 1301.}
\footnote{341} Griffin, supra note 115, at 115. Others have described the unsafe verdict standard as one compelling relief if the court determines that it is “no longer reasonably likely that the same verdict would have resulted.”\footnote{Id. at 116.}
These critiques of the NCIIC approach have real bite, but pragmatic considerations caution against adopting them any time soon. The Innocence Commission is a novel institution, operating within a limited budget, and taking on a relatively unpopular task. For it to succeed, it must be extremely cautious in its early phases. The new-evidence requirement is a mechanism allowing the Commission to limit its “docket,” and thus focus its limited resources on the most promising and sympathetic subset of innocence claims. Moreover, this subset of cases responds directly to the sensational stores of post-conviction vindication that sparked the creation of the Commission in the first place: namely, cases in which new evidence proved the convicted person’s innocence. Perhaps a more secure Commission, one that has become an uncontroversial part of the criminal justice landscape in North Carolina, may reconsider the new-evidence requirement at some point. But here and now, the most prudent course is to continue to require new evidence before acting on innocence claims.

The clear and convincing standard is also a pragmatic way to limit relief to those whom the panel deems positively innocent. An unsafe verdict standard raises the possibility that the court could vacate a conviction not because it finds the petitioner innocent, but rather because it is not convinced of the petitioner’s guilt. The gray area between actual innocence and doubtful guilt is a fascinating place for theoretical inquiry, but it is not the area that the commission system was created to explore. The commission system’s mandate is to vindicate only those who can show actual innocence. For that mandate, a clear and convincing proof of innocence is the right standard. Moreover, the high standard serves an important signaling function to the wider public: it assures state citizens that only the most worthy petitioners, those with clear and positive evidence of innocence, will be exonerated. For these pragmatic reasons, the new-evidence requirement and the high standard of proof are prudent ways for the Commission to achieve greater legitimacy within the state criminal justice system and to build a record as a cautious and prudent institution.

**CONCLUSION**

Innocence commissions will not make our country’s Innocence Problem go away. Even if every state and the federal government adopted the Commission model, innocent people will continue to be convicted and punished for crimes they did not commit, and innocence commissions will fail to right many miscarriages of justice. The problems of wrongful conviction stem from a long list of issues in law enforcement and trial procedures—from police line-up practices to eyewitness evidence rules to our system of indigent defense, to name only a few. And the problems besetting our existing court-based regime of post-conviction review will remain largely untouched by the establishment of innocence commissions. The

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342 If we take seriously the proposition that juries can make mistakes on the facts in front of them, then there is no reason in principle to demand new evidence from a petitioner claiming factual innocence. Perhaps the burden of proof on such a petitioner ought to be higher than on a petitioner who brings new and credible evidence, something analogous to the “beyond a reasonable doubt standard” in reverse. See, e.g., Risinger, supra note 339, at 1310–13.
The commission approach represents not a “fix” for habeas corpus and other post-conviction procedures, but rather an attempt to escape the whole tangled mess. The commission approach aims to reform only one small piece of the puzzle—namely, how to address freestanding post-conviction claims of actual innocence. And with respect to that narrow problem, the commission approach offers a significant improvement over the status quo. By providing a dedicated address for petitioners to make claims of factual innocence and a staff with the power and expertise to assess those claims, the commission approach cuts through the systemic difficulties of reviewing final convictions.

Some of the reluctance to create new post-conviction procedures stems from a legitimate fear that new procedures will exact too high a price in real dollars and in the constellation of finality values. But what we have learned over the past fifteen years is that the existing system overvalues finality at the price of too many miscarriages of justice. The commission approach represents a modest but necessary correction to that imbalance.

As a new institution and an independent agency, the NCIIC must itself strike a delicate balance between efficacy and fairness. The Commission ought to bolster procedural fairness in two ways: (1) by requiring a commissioner—rather than a staff member—to approve all denials; and (2) by providing for some type of limited and deferential judicial review of denials. In time, the Commission ought to consider dropping the new-evidence requirement, for some jury decisions are simply wrong on the evidence before them.

Overall, in just over three years of operation, the NCIIC is proving itself to be an extremely promising new mechanism for providing post-conviction factual review. The exoneration of Greg Taylor in February 2010 was a giant step in the maturation of the Commission. There is hope that this experiment will continue to attract serious scholarly attention and criticism in the months and years ahead and that it will, in its own modest way, contribute to an improvement in justice in America.